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RESTRUCTURING A SOVEREIGN BOND
PARI PASSU WORK-AROUND:
CAN HOLDOUT CREDITORS
EVER HAVE EQUAL TREATMENT?
Natalie A. Turchi*
The rise of vulture fund investing in sovereign bonds has created
additional hurdles to successful restructuring in an already fragile ad hoc
process. Recent litigation in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina has proven
courts’ willingness to utilize powers of equity to enforce a ratable payment
interpretation of the pari passu clause—the equal treatment provision
commonly found in sovereign bond contracts—creating much uncertainty
on how the ruling will affect future restructuring efforts. By looking to the
tension in interpretations of the pari passu clause, discrepancies in
remedial relief awarded, and international institutions’ proposed solutions,
this Note analyzes the role of the pari passu clause as a tool for holdout
creditors to disrupt restructurings. This Note argues for a contractual
solution targeted at preventing vulture fund investors from access to pari
passu injunctive relief coupled with creative restructuring strategies for
outstanding bonds awaiting maturity. This resolution seeks to retain some
protection for traditional holdout creditors while disincentivizing
investments made with intent to derail restructurings from the start.
Unlike debtors in the domestic bankruptcy system, sovereigns have no
overarching mechanism to facilitate a successful restructuring when their
debt burden becomes unsustainable. Using the pari passu clause as a
means to enjoin payment to restructured bondholders leaves sovereign
debtors with little recourse but to cede to the demands of holdout creditors
and can have a devastating long-term impact on the sovereign’s capacity to
rebuild debt sustainability. On the other hand, removing pari passu
injunctive relief strips holdout creditors of a valuable enforcement
mechanism and can leave sovereigns unrestrained. This Note balances
these concerns by advocating for a solution that diminishes vulture creditor
leverage that can obstruct a restructuring, while otherwise preserving
creditor rights against unfair or coercive exchange terms.
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2011, Elliott School of
International Affairs at George Washington University. I give my sincerest gratitude to my
advisor, Professor Caroline Gentile, for providing guidance and wisdom throughout this
journey. I would also like to thank Professor Susan Block-Lieb for contributing insightful
comments to my work. Lastly, I am forever indebted to my family for the unconditional
support and unbridled enthusiasm they provide throughout all of my endeavors.
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INTRODUCTION
A sovereign will go to great lengths to prevent the derailment of a debt
restructuring that could result in economic disaster. In September 2014,
after a hearing before a New York federal court in NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Argentina, 1 the sovereign nation of Argentina was found to be in civil
contempt for proposing a bond payment system that was found to evade a
payment structure mandated by court injunction. 2 While it is extremely
rare to hold a party in contempt, 3 let alone a sovereign nation, 4 courts have
not shied away from employing their full arsenal of enforcement tools in
sovereign debt litigation. 5 Argentina’s actions were a result of its strategy
to avoid a remedial order that conditioned payment to restructured
bondholders on the full payment of principal and interest owed to holdout
creditors, which Argentina claims would have grave economic
consequences. 6 The court’s power to provide such injunctive relief and
grant the contempt order are both derived from the enforcement of one brief
provision’s meaning: the pari passu clause in the bond contract. 7

1. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 2012 WL
5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (establishing injunction); Order, NML Capital, No. 08
Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014), ECF No. 687 (finding contempt for violating
injunction).
2. Transcript of Hearing at 25:5–28:20, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 29, 2014), available at http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/ArgentineSovereign-Debt/2014/Arg180-093014-e9t9repc.pdf; see also Amended and Supplemental
Contempt Order at 3, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2014), ECF No.
693.
3. See Transcript of Hearing, supra note 2, at 28:5–6 (explaining that “to hold a party
in contempt of court is a rare thing”).
4. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt Litigation,
31 YALE J. ON REG. 189, 208 (2014) (noting that the risk of contempt typically falls on third
parties when a sovereign is enjoined).
5. See, e.g., Servaas Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, No. 09 Civ. 1862 (RMB), 2014 WL
279507, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2014) (imposing $2,000 contempt sanction on Iraq for each
day of failure to comply with discovery order); see also FG Hemisphere Assocs., LLC v.
Democratic Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 377–79 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Autotech Techs. LP
v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737, 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that courts are
authorized to issue monetary contempt sanctions against foreign sovereigns as well as able to
use any powers necessary to bring the suit to resolution).
6. See Brief of Defendant at 10–11, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2014), ECF No. 685; see also infra Part II.A.2.
7. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 195.
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Different interpretations of the pari passu clause have sparked much
debate on the role of holdout creditors, particularly vulture funds, in the
sovereign debt restructuring process. 8 Despite the small percentage of
creditors who hold out in a restructuring, 9 pari passu interpretation has
overwhelmingly high economic stakes at play for two main reasons. First,
the numbers: it is estimated that there is currently approximately $900
billion in outstanding sovereign bonds that are affected by the
interpretation. 10 Second, the interpretation’s enforcement can unhinge a
restructuring and impact third parties.11 In June 2014, the consequences of
the court’s injunctions against Argentina reverberated loudly when the
country found itself in a technical default on a $539 million interest
payment to a class of restructured bondholders for failure to pay the $1.5
billion due to holdouts. 12
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously opined
that “great cases, like hard cases, make bad law.” 13 To determine whether
the much-debated adage proves true with NML Capital, the case’s progeny
and the bounds of stare decisis will test the breadth of its applicability. 14
Until that time, the multibillion dollar sovereign bond market governed
under New York law requires that which the ruling cannot provide:
certainty, predictability, and uniformity. 15 Sovereign bond underwriters,
issuers, and purchasers should therefore act now to prevent a sequel to the
Argentine technical default disaster.
It is unclear how broadly the rulings will be applied, and what their
implications are for future sovereign bond restructurings where the
Conflicting
underlying bond issuances contain similar language. 16
8. Compare Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott
Case: A Brilliant Strategy But an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV.
39 (2011), with Robert A. Cohen, “Sometimes A Cigar Is Just A Cigar”: The Simple Story
of Pari Passu, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2011).
9. See Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature
Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 28 (IMF, Working Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012), available
at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26190.0 (finding that participation
rates in exchange offers typically exceed 90 percent).
10. See Sean Hagan, Acting Collectively: A Better Way to Restructure Government,
IMFDIRECT (Nov. 24, 2014), http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2014/11/24/acting-collectively-abetter-way-to-restructure-government-debt/.
11. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 215–16.
12. Camila Russo & Katia Porzecanski, Argentina Declared in Default by S&P As Talks
Fail, BLOOMBERG NEWS (July 30, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0730/argentina-defaults-according-to-s-p-as-debt-meetings-continue.html.
13. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(finding that cases can be deemed “great” simply because their immediate interest creates a
“hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful”); see also
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the (D)Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN.
L. REV. 961, 965–69 (1998).
14. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 192.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. Cf. Romain Zamour, NML v. Argentina and the Ratable Payment Interpretation of
the Pari Passu Clause, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 55, 63–65 (2013) (arguing that contrary
to the general belief that the decision was widely applicable, it was actually narrow in
scope).
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understandings of the meaning of pari passu by market actors and under
other governing laws suggest the potential for the New York decision to
have broad and far-reaching consequences for permitting holdout creditors
to block future restructurings. 17 This uncertainty is underscored by the lack
of a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism that mimics the oversight provided
by the domestic bankruptcy system to ensure protections for both creditors
and debtors such that neither abuses the system. 18
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the sovereign bond market,
the salient features of the restructuring process including the absence of an
overarching bankruptcy regime, and the relevance of the pari passu clause,
particularly its use by holdout creditors in sovereign bond restructurings.
Part II begins with an examination of the conflicting judicial interpretations
of the pari passu clause, the tensions in remedies that follow from those
interpretations, and the reactions from various market actors and
governments. Part II then introduces and discusses several proposed
approaches to preventing pari passu clauses from disrupting payment to
exchange bondholders, which includes both contractual and sovereign
bankruptcy regime solutions. Part III suggests a contractual solution that
would be easier to implement than a new bankruptcy regime. This solution
should be targeted at limiting remedies available to vulture funds that
purchase bonds at the time the sovereign’s debt burden is already
unsustainable or presumed unsustainable. Finally, Part III addresses the
complexities of the suggested contractual approach and the outstanding
bonds whose contracts do not contain the new language.
I. SOVEREIGN BONDS: THE MARKET, THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS,
AND THE RELEVANCE OF PARI PASSU
This Note begins by laying the groundwork for the pari passu debate by
placing the provision in the context of the sovereign bond market generally.
Part I.A provides background on the structure of the sovereign bond
market’s size, reasons for countries to issue bond debt, and a history of
restructurings. Part I.B then addresses the important aspects of the
restructuring process, discussing the lack of an oversight mechanism and
the reason creditors hold out. Part I.C introduces the equal treatment
provision found in sovereign bonds, the pari passu clause, by explaining its
relevance in bond restructurings and use by holdout creditors.
A. Sovereign Bond Basics
The sovereign debt market is considered to be one of the oldest securities
markets currently in existence, with “sovereign states . . . borrowing from

17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1049 (2004). See generally
Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 967 (2000).
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time immemorial.” 19 One way that sovereigns borrow money to finance a
wide range of activities is through the issuance of sovereign bonds. 20 A
bond is “an obligation to pay a fixed sum of money, at a definite time, with
a stated interest.” 21 In its simplest form, a bond is a debt instrument that
memorializes the debtor’s promise to pay back the principal sum received
from the creditor, the interest amount on that principal, and the terms for
payment of both. 22 A bond indenture is a contract that outlines the bond’s
face value, interest rate, maturity date, and other key features, 23 making the
terms enforceable under the governing contract law.24 This section begins
with an overview of bond terminology followed by a discussion of the
reasons for and benefits of structuring sovereign debt in bonds, the scope of
the market, and background on sovereign debt restructurings.
1. Fundamental Concept Overview
The actual bond terms that go into an offering are determined by a host
of complex factors that vary by issuing country. 25 A sovereign will decide
the bonds’ maturity, 26 i.e., whether to issue short-term or long-term bonds,
based on internal factors and a mix of market factors that include demand
and bond yield. 27 Bond yields are determined by a combination of countryspecific factors, international factors, and investor risk preference. 28
Additionally, the way a country structures its bond debt depends on whether
the primary target for borrowing is to raise domestic or external debt. 29
External debt is debt that is issued under foreign law and denominated in
foreign currency. 30 Historically separate debt instruments were issued for
foreign investors and domestic residents, but the loosening of international
capital markets has allowed both types of creditors to invest in both types of
19. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION 18
(2013).
20. See generally id. at 18–30.
21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (10th ed. 2014).
22. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1324, 1329 (2002).
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (10th ed. 2014).
24. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992); see also
infra Part I.B.2 (discussing holdout creditor enforcement litigation).
25. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 24.
26. The date of maturity is the date when the total bond debt becomes due. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 478 (10th ed. 2014). This encompasses the entirety of the payment
obligation to the creditor. See id. (defining “maturity value”).
27. Fabrizio Zampolli, Sovereign Debt Management As an Instrument of Monetary
Policy: An Overview, in THREAT OF FISCAL DOMINANCE? 102, 110 (2012), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap65f_rh.pdf. Internal factors for sovereign preference
include desired levels of liquidity and whether there is a stronger desire to reduce risk of
raising taxes in the future (long-term bonds), or to reduce interest payments (short-term
bonds). Id.
28. See Blaise Gadanecz, Ken Miyajima & Chang Shu, Exchange Rate Risk and Local
Currency Sovereign Bond Yield in Emerging Markets 2 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working
Paper No. 474, 2014), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work474.pdf.
29. See generally Anna Gelpern & Brad Setser, Domestic and External Debt: The
Doomed Quest for Equal Treatment, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 795 (2004).
30. Id.
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bonds. 31 The diversified debt composition has created a unique set of legal
characteristics that raise concerns about inter-creditor equity in the
treatment of foreign and domestic creditors, particularly in the event of
financial crisis. 32
The majority of sovereign bonds are external debt. 33 This is especially
true for emerging market bonds that benefit from the economic stability of
issuing bond debt under a foreign currency and can attract more investors if
the bond terms are enforceable under foreign law. 34 This Note focuses on
sovereign bonds that are issued as external debt. The majority of external
debt is issued under and governed by New York or English law. 35 These
courts are therefore the most significant in their ability to interpret and
enforce the terms of the bond contract. 36
2. Why Countries Issue Bonds
Countries enter the sovereign debt market for access to capital—
frequently from foreign creditors. 37 Their reasons for borrowing can range
from the need to fund daily expenditures to financing infrastructure projects
and wars. 38 Although a sovereign can choose to structure its debt through
different types of debt instruments, 39 the economic classification40 and
credit rating of a country can inform the financing options available to it. 41

31. Id. at 796.
32. Id.; see also infra Parts I.C, II.A (discussing the relevance of intercreditor treatment
and external indebtedness).
33. See Das et al., supra note 9, at 41 (“Typically, international bonds are issued under
foreign laws.”).
34. See Elmar B. Koch, Collective Action Clauses: The Way Forward, 35 GEO. J. INT’L
L. 665, 668 (2004) (noting the particular importance of foreign jurisdiction issuance for
emerging market economies); cf. Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Ignacio Tirado, The
Problem of Holdout Creditors in Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructurings 5 (Jan. 22, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2205704 (discussing debt
issued under domestic laws where the sovereign has the direct ability to change laws that
alter their obligations under the debt instrument in the event of a debt crisis). Greece used
this strategy during its recent restructuring for the 93 percent of bonds that were governed
under Greek law. Id.
35. HOLGER SCHIER, TOWARDS A REORGANIZATION SYSTEM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT 12
(2007); see also Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt,
36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 299, 302 (2005) (noting that the largest portion of emerging market debt
is governed under New York law).
36. See generally infra Part II.A.
37. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 18.
38. See id.
39. Cf. Das et al., supra note 9, at 14–18 (discussing differences between bilateral and
bank debt in the restructuring context). A debt is a “specific sum of money due by
agreement or otherwise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (10th ed. 2014).
40. Countries are categorized as either advanced or developing/emerging market
economies. See IMF, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK REPORT 162–66 & tbl.A (2014), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/pdf/text.pdf.
41. See Donato Masciandaro, Sovereign Debt: Financial Market Over-Reliance on
Credit Rating Agencies, in SOVEREIGN RISK: A WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS? 58
(2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72j.pdf. Ratings also affect the
prices of government bonds, and therefore affect bond yields and margins. Id.
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For a country to engage in long-term financing through international
capital markets, sovereign bonds are one of the most important
mechanisms. 42 For sovereigns, bonds provide much more flexibility by
allowing longer maturities and less restrictive covenants than other types of
financing such as loans from commercial banks. 43 Bonds are also more
easily traded on stock exchanges and have less complicated clearing and
settlement procedures. 44 For investors, bonds are attractive because credit
ratings make risk assessment, pricing, and trading more accessible. 45 This
in turn means that the sovereign bond market creates access to more foreign
investors and therefore a larger source of capital.46
An increase in bond issuances began largely in response to the banking
crisis in the 1980s that made other forms of financing unavailable or
difficult to obtain. 47 Although the initial shift was seen as temporary, the
sovereign bond market began to grow in response to the realization of the
many benefits bond financing provided, particularly for emerging market
countries. 48 Since the 1990s, bonds have become the primary source of
financing to emerging market economies. 49 Although advanced economies
generally enjoy a wide variety of financing options, 50 they also hold an
increasing percentage of their debt in sovereign bonds. 51
3. Market Size
The widespread use of sovereign deficit financing with bonds has made
capital markets more efficient and diversified.52 It should therefore come
as no surprise that the sovereign bond market holds trillions of dollars in
value. It is estimated that in the third quarter of 2014 alone, Eurobond
trading (foreign currency–denominated bonds) was valued at $597 billion.53

42. RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
105 (2010).
43. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1068.
44. Id. The clearing and settlement procedures relate solely to the instrument trading
transaction and not to the settlement of claims in the event of a default, which is discussed in
greater detail in Part I.B.
45. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1068–69.
46. Cf. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1632–33 (2006) (contrasting emerging market economy access
to capital with developed economies that have “well-established domestic financial systems,
steady access to domestic and international investors, and the capacity to issue debt in their
own currencies”).
47. See id. at 1633–34 (noting the shift from bank loans to bonds following a wave of
loan defaults); see also infra Part I.A.3, I.B (discussing Brady Bonds and how the changing
composition of sovereign debt has impacted restructurings).
48. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1067 & nn.116–18.
49. Id. at 1069.
50. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at 1633.
51. See Masciandaro, supra note 41, at 50 & n.2 (noting that government bonds for
advanced economies have increased from 75 percent to 110 percent of GDP).
52. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 152.
53. Press Release, Emerging Mkt. Trade Ass’n, EMTA Survey: Third Quarter
Emerging Market Debt Trading at $1.454 Trillion 2 (Dec. 2, 2014), available at
http://www.emta.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=9168.
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One figure for government bonds in 2000 found that for thirty-five
countries assessed, there were $608 billion in outstanding foreign currency
sovereign bonds, 54 and by 2008, bonds for long-term public external debt
totaled $1.4 trillion. 55
4. History of Restructurings
A sovereign that no longer has the ability to support its debt obligations
will seek to regain debt sustainability by restructuring its payment
obligations as part of a bond exchange. 56 The mechanics of this process are
outlined in Part I.B.2.
There was a resurgence of sovereign bond restructurings following the
Brady Plan in the mid-1990s. 57 Under the plan, bonds were partly
collateralized under the U.S. Treasury, which enabled them to become a
tradable instrument. 58 This system provided new capital influx to emerging
economies and also had the effect of creating a liquid secondary bond
market. 59
The introduction of Brady bonds also marked a great shift in creditor
lending. 60 Before the 1980s, sovereign lending was done primarily by
syndicated bank loans. 61 Once the Brady Plan provided an outlet for
emerging market economies to restructure their unsustainable debt—held
primarily in the form of syndicated loans—by exchanging it with bonds, the
majority of emerging market debt held by private investors shifted to bonds
from commercial loans. 62
While this bond structure seemed to benefit emerging market economies
overall and led to an increase in foreign capital investing in those countries,
the system created some new default risks that threatened debt
sustainability for participating countries. 63 The default risks eventually led

54. Stijn Claessens, Daniela Klingebiel & Sergio L. Schmukler, Government Bonds in
Domestic and Foreign Currency: The Role of Institutional and Macroeconomic Factors, 15
REV. INT’L ECON. 370, 376 & fig.3 (2007).
55. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, International Government
Debt 5 & fig.1 (UN, Working Paper No. 199, 2010), available at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/osgdp20103_en.pdf.
56. See Das et al., supra note 9, at 7.
57. Id. at 32.
58. See id. at 18.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 47–51 and accompanying text.
61. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 105. Syndicate loans are loans that are
provided by institutional lenders. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1679 (10th ed. 2014)
(defining syndicate as “[a] group organized for a common purpose; esp., an association
formed to promote a common interest, carry out a particular business transaction . . . .”).
Syndicate loans and commercial bank loans are used interchangeably.
62. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 105–06.
63. Das et al., supra note 9, at 18. The default risks were mainly caused by the way
interest payments were structured, which threatened the debt sustainability of the debtor
countries. Id.
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to Brady Bond defaults in several countries, precipitating another bond
restructuring in those cases. 64
From 1998 to 2010, there were seventeen distressed sovereign bond
restructurings. 65 During that same period, there was an increase in the
number of restructurings that involved a reduction in the restructured
instruments’ face value. 66 The majority of deals in the 1990s and 2000s
came with an implied debt write-down, which was not the case before. 67
B. Salient Features of the Restructuring Process
This section provides a framework for understanding the ways a
sovereign bond restructuring can become susceptible to disruption.
Part I.B.1 discusses how the lack of a sovereign bankruptcy regime impacts
the terms of restructuring as compared to one conducted under a domestic
bankruptcy system. Part I.B.2 outlines the mechanics of exchange offers.
Part I.B.3 then discusses holdout creditors and their role in the process.
1. Absence of a Bankruptcy Regime
As compared to the robust system established to oversee domestic
bankruptcy, 68 there is no central authority to facilitate restructuring
following a sovereign default. 69 Despite various proposals for creation of
judicial oversight, global statutory schemes have failed to be
implemented. 70 Therefore, restructuring is conducted on an ad hoc basis,
addressing individual concerns case-by-case. 71 This system has many
problems and can make for a process plagued by inefficiency and
unpredictability. 72 This section addresses distinguishing features of the
sovereign restructuring process that result from the absence of a bankruptcy
regime.

64. Id. One country that required a Brady Bond restructuring was Peru. See infra notes
210–11 and accompanying text.
65. Das et al., supra note 9, at 33.
66. Id. at 34.
67. Id. This trend can be attributed in part to worldwide debt relief initiatives as well as
changes in the administration of bond restructuring. Id.
68. See Anna Gelpern, A Skeptic’s Case for Sovereign Bankruptcy, 50 HOUS. L. REV.
1095, 1098 (2013). See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012) (demonstrating the
thoroughness of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
69. See In re Bd. of Directors of Multicanal S.A., 307 B.R. 384, 392 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“[A] sovereign cannot file an insolvency case, and there are no recognized
proceedings available to prevent holders of debt . . . from pursuing their claims against a
sovereign debtor.”); see also Eugenio A. Bruno, Fundamentals of Sovereign Debt, in
SOVEREIGN DEBT AND DEBT RESTRUCTURING 5 (Eugenio A. Bruno ed., 2013).
70. See generally Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for
Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976–2001, 49 IMF STAFF PAPERS 470 (2002). The largest
hurdle appears to be “substantial disagreement on which approach is the best.” Id. at 499.
71. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 104.
72. See generally Molly Ryan, Sovereign Bankruptcy: Why Now and Why Not in the
IMF, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2473 (2014).
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a. Balancing Creditor and Debtor Interests
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides a comprehensive system of
protections for both debtors and creditors, which proponents of a statutory
approach to sovereign restructuring have sought to emulate. 73 Although
attempts to create such a system have been unsuccessful, examining certain
protections in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, particularly corporate
restructuring under Chapter 11, can provide a useful though imperfect
metaphor to understanding process failures in sovereign debt
restructuring. 74
When applying bankruptcy principles to sovereigns, Chapters 9 and 11 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which outline the reorganization of insolvent
municipalities and corporations, respectively, are therefore most frequently
viewed for comparison. 75 In understanding the analogy of commercial debt
to sovereign debt, several key distinguishing features must be noted. 76
First, the inability to evaluate the debtor’s actual financial condition means
that it is difficult for creditors to determine when a sovereign is actually
unable to pay its debts as opposed to engaging in an opportunistic default.77
Even where the default is legitimately the result of unsustainable debt, the
lack of financial transparency means that creditors can still become
vulnerable to unreasonable restructuring terms. 78
Second, under the domestic system, U.S. bankruptcy courts play a large
role in balancing the concerns of both debtors and creditors to effectuate
fair and equitable results in the administration of bankruptcy. 79 Once a
debtor is in bankruptcy, there are a host of protections that become
available. 80 Particularly necessary to successful reorganization for the
debtor are: (1) the issuance of an automatic stay, 81 (2) the debtor-inpossession’s access to financing, 82 and (3) the ability of a court to confirm a
binding reorganization plan despite creditor objection. 83 Creditors also
have a number of ways to ensure that their interests are protected,

73. See ANNE O. KRUEGER, IMF, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT
RESTRUCTURING 10–20 (2002), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.
74. See id.; see also SCHIER, supra note 35, at 37–44.
75. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–946 (2012) (chapter 9); id. §§ 1101–1174 (chapter 11); see
also SCHIER, supra note 35, at 37.
76. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1045.
77. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Evolution of Contractual
Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 133 (2012).
78. Id.
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (outlining the broad power of the court).
80. See SCHIER, supra note 35, at 37–44.
81. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 922.
82. See id. § 364.
83. Cf. In re Genco Shipping & Trading Ltd., 513 B.R. 233, 241 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(noting that a reorganization plan “may still be confirmed [by the court] over the rejection of
a class of claims or interests” under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) if it meets the other criteria in 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a) save for affirmative consent of all impaired parties).
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including: (1) the implementation of creditors’ committees, 84 (2) court
review of reorganization plans for fairness, 85 and (3) rules such as
preference avoidance that prevent creditors from receiving an unfair priority
in payment. 86 In the absence of these formal procedures to safeguard
creditor and debtor interests, the leverage each brings to the negotiating
table can dictate the restructuring’s success. 87
b. Creditor Coordination Problems
One of the major downsides of the diversification of sovereign bond
creditors is that it creates coordination problems in restructuring. 88 Bonds
are held by a wide range of entities including: banks (large commercial,
small commercial, local, and investment), pension funds, mutual funds,
hedge funds, nonfinancial companies, and retail investors. 89 The wide
dispersion of creditors, coupled with the fact that many bond purchases are
made on the secondary bond market, makes it more difficult to identify
major bondholders during a restructuring than with bilateral or syndicate
loans, which are more concentrated. 90
Even if creditors can be identified, they can be difficult to coordinate
because they are increasingly numerous. 91 For example, there were
100,000 retail investors affected by the 2000 Ukraine bond restructuring
and 600,000 impacted by the 2005 Argentine debt restructuring. 92 The
varying concerns and interests represented by creditors can severely inhibit
restructuring efforts and have become more problematic in recent years as
the composition of sovereign debt issued in bonds increases. 93 Such a
diffuse group of creditors particularly creates the risk of a collective action

84. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102–1103 (noting the broad powers and duties of creditor committees
in monitoring and participating in reorganization).
85. Id. § 943(b)(7) (municipal bankruptcy “best interest of creditors” standard); id.
§ 1129(a)(2) (three-part fairness test for chapter 11); see also William W. Bratton & G. Mitu
Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38–
41 (2004) (discussing differing fairness standards for court review of a reorganization plan
under U.S. Bankruptcy Code for protection of creditors).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). A debtor is presumed insolvent on and during the ninety days
prior to the bankruptcy petition filing. Id. § 547(f). A trustee in bankruptcy can avoid any
transfer of the debtor’s property that was made (1) for the benefit of a creditor (2) on account
of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was made (3) while the debtor
was insolvent (4) on or during the ninety days prior to filing for bankruptcy (5) that allows
the creditor to receive more than the creditor would from a chapter seven liquidation if the
transfer was not made and the creditor had received payment to the extent permitted by the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 547(b).
87. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 85, at 24–25.
88. See OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 152.
89. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1070.
90. Das et al., supra note 9, at 13, 17.
91. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 152.
92. Das et al., supra note 9, at 21.
93. Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Deveno, Distressed Sovereign Debt: A Creditor’s
Perspective, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 180 (2003).
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problem, which in turn can elicit a delay in restructuring from sovereigns to
ensure maximum participation. 94
c. Contracting with Collective Action Clauses and Exit Consents
To make restructuring more efficient, parties have sought to compensate
for the lack of a bankruptcy system by including detailed contractual
provisions, 95 including collective action clauses 96 (CACs) and exit
consents. 97
CACs address the issue of creditor coordination and prevent a minority
of creditors from manipulating the restructuring process for their own
benefit. 98 They accomplish this by specifying the supermajority percentage
of creditors necessary to alter payment obligations on the bonds that
become binding on all bondholders. 99 Under English law, CACs were first
used as far back as 1879 and are a “regular feature” of both corporate and
sovereign bonds today. 100 Although New York bonds only adopted the
same standard starting in 2003, 101 CACs have been broadly incorporated in
sovereign bonds since then. 102 Today, CACs are standard in all sovereign
bonds. 103
For New York law bonds issued prior to 2003, unanimous action clauses
(UACs) are standard. 104 UACs require unanimous bondholder approval to
modify any terms of principal or interest payment. 105 To counterbalance
the problem of dissident creditors in bonds that contain UACs, exit consents
are seen as a valuable alternative to CACs. 106 Exit consents make
acceptance of an exchange offer conditional on the creditor’s consent to
amend certain nonpayment terms of the original bond. 107 Even under a
UAC, nonpayment terms generally can be modified with a majority or
supermajority. 108 Modifying various nonpayment terms of the original
bond to reduce its value will therefore persuade exchange offer acceptance
if the retention of the bond becomes less attractive to investors. 109
94. KRUEGER, supra note 73, at 1.
95. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 28.
96. Id.
97. SCHIER, supra note 35, at 20.
98. Koch, supra note 34, at 667.
99. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 111–13. Majority action clauses technically
denote a subset of CACs, but for purposes of this discussion, the terms will be used
interchangeably. See id.
100. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 22, at 1325.
101. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 116.
102. See Koch, supra note 34, at 665–66.
103. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 24, 28.
104. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 932–33 (2004).
105. Id. at 932.
106. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1090–92.
107. Id. at 1091.
108. Id.
109. Id. The bond restructurings of Ecuador in 2000, Uruguay in 2003, and the
Dominican Republic in 2005 are examples of successful restructurings that used exchange
offers coupled with exit consents. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Clause in
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2. Role and Mechanics of Exchange Offers
During a sovereign bond restructuring, outstanding bonds 110 are
exchanged for cash or new bonds through a legal process. 111 Under the
exchange, the payment terms of new bonds are designed to resolve the debt
crisis episode. 112 This is achieved either by extending the maturity on the
bond (“debt rescheduling”), by reducing the face value of the principal or
interest rate (“debt reduction”), or a combination of both. 113 In the sixty
years from 1950 to 2010, there have been more than six hundred
restructurings that span over ninety-five countries. 114
When the restructuring occurs in the wake of a sovereign debt crisis, it
implies a debt exchange with terms that are less favorable than the terms on
the original bond due to the sovereign’s inability to pay. 115 The amount by
which the original instrument’s face value is decreased is called a
haircut. 116 This type of restructuring is referred to as a distressed debt
restructuring. 117
The restructuring process is triggered by either a default (in the case of a
post-default restructuring) or by an announcement of a restructuring (in the
Following the default or
case of a preemptive restructuring). 118
announcement, the negotiation period commences. 119 Throughout the
negotiation period, which can take anywhere from several months to several
years, the terms of the debt exchange are determined. 120 During this time,
the sovereign will typically announce its fiscal and debt management plans
in conjunction with a macroeconomic adjustment program as well as an
Sovereign Debt Instruments: Developments in Recent Litigation, in SOVEREIGN RISK: A
WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS?, supra note 41, at 122, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72u.pdf.
110. Outstanding bonds are bonds that have not yet reached maturity and are therefore
unpaid debts. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (10th ed. 2014).
111. Das et al., supra note 9, at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id. A debt rescheduling occurs when the maturity period on the bond is extended,
which can yield lower interest rates. Id. A debt reduction occurs when there is a reduction in
the face or nominal value from the original instruments to the exchanged instruments. Id.
114. See id. at 30–32.
115. Id. at 7 (citing definition by Standard & Poor’s (2006)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Id. Greece is an example of the largest preemptive restructuring. See IMF,
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 6, 22 (2013), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf (noting that Greece’s €205 billion
debt restructuring in February 2012 was the “largest sovereign debt restructuring in
history”). Other countries such as Jamaica, Belize, Dominican Republic, and Grenada have
also restructured preemptively. Id. at 22. IMF policy encourages member countries to
initiate a preemptive restructuring rather than wait until default so that the country can
continue to service its original claims during the restructuring process. Id. at 11. The
importance of avoiding a default is to prevent “exacerbat[ing] the immediate economic and
financial dislocation” and to not interfere with a sovereign’s ability to re-access international
private capital. Id.
119. Das et al., supra note 9, at 13.
120. Id. at 12–13.

2015]

SOVEREIGN BONDS AND THE PARI PASSU CLAUSE

2185

overall evaluation of its financial situation. 121 Following the negotiation
period, an exchange offer is prepared by the government and presented to
creditors, at which point the creditors can choose to accept or reject the
offer. 122
The offer period presents the most difficulty for creditor coordination and
risk of holdouts. 123 Often, a sovereign will make an exchange contingent
upon acceptance by a minimum number of creditors to ensure a successful
exchange. 124 Following the exchange offer period, the debt exchange takes
place. 125
One successful method to incentivize bondholder participation in a
sovereign bond restructuring has been through the use of legal or financial
“sweeteners.” 126 The practice of using sweeteners to entice participation is
widespread, and there are a number of creative options that sovereigns have
used to increase participation rates. 127 In fact, actual participation rates
surpassed 90 percent in most recent sovereign bond exchanges. 128
3. Holdout Creditors
Due to the voluntary nature of the restructuring process, creditors may
reject the terms of the exchange offer and “hold out” for the possibility of
receiving better repayment value or even the full face value of the bond.129
Holdout creditors have the right to enforce the obligations of the original
bond under contract law. 130 In negotiating the terms of an exchange offer,
creditors can therefore leverage their right to seek judicial enforcement as
both a protection against unfair restructuring terms or opportunistic default
and to receive better repayment terms. 131 Given the high costs of sovereign
debt litigation and the difficulty of enforcing judgments against sovereigns,
holdout litigation traditionally has not been an effective recovery
method. 132 However, recent strategies employed by a type of holdout
creditor known as a vulture fund have created an increase in holdout
litigation and strengthened the role of holdouts in the restructuring
process. 133
121. Id.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 109, at 122. Some examples of contractual sweeteners
include a most favored creditor clause, mandatory prepayment clauses/mandatory
restatement of principle clauses, credit-linked notes, a guarantee, use of principal defeasance,
or use of collateral. Id. The specifics of these contractual sweeteners are beyond the scope of
this Note.
127. See id.
128. Das et al., supra note 9, at 26.
129. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1045.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 45 (describing litigation against a sovereign as
“largely a fruitless exercise”).
133. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1089–90.
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a. Overcoming Sovereign Immunity in Enforcement
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 134 (FSIA), a foreign state is
presumptively granted jurisdictional immunity unless one of the
enumerated exceptions applies. 135 Most courts interpret the issuance of
public debt to fall under the commercial activity exception, barring
sovereign immunity defenses in sovereign debt cases.136 Sovereigns also
frequently waive their immunity by consenting to U.S. court jurisdiction in
their bond contracts. 137 This means that the FSIA is not a significant
barrier for holdout creditors seeking to obtain a judgment, although it still
remains extremely relevant for attachment proceedings to enforce the
judgment. 138
The act of state doctrine and international comity are two other potential
sources of limitations on creditor recovery. Courts have declined to apply
the act of state doctrine to cases of sovereign debt contract breach. 139 New
York courts in particular have long understood that foreign sovereigns
acting in a commercial capacity are not afforded judicial abstention because
the sovereign action is not analogous to an act of state, for which judicial
scrutiny would be seen as “affronting their sovereignty.” 140 Likewise,
international comity has not provided reprieve for sovereign debtors. 141
b. Bond Contract Enforcement
In the Unites States, contract rights are considered so fundamental that
their protection against impairment is explicitly stated in the U.S.

134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1602–1611 (2012).
135. Id. § 1330 (granting original jurisdiction to federal district courts for any claim
where a “foreign state is not entitled to immunity” under §§ 1605–1607 or other applicable
international agreements). See generally id. §§ 1602–1611.
136. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1992); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (commercial activity exception from immunity); Fisch &
Gentile, supra note 18, at 1076.
137. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., 676 F.2d 47, 48
(2d Cir. 1982); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (explicit or implied waiver exception to
sovereign immunity); Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1076.
138. Walters v. Indus. & Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 289 (2d Cir.
2011) (finding “execution immunity afforded sovereign property is broader than the
jurisdictional immunity afforded the sovereign itself” under 28 U.S.C. § 1609); see also
Jonathan I. Blackman & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation:
Vultures, Alter Egos, and Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 57 (2010).
139. See, e.g., Allied Bank Int’l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516,
522–23 (2d Cir. 1985).
140. See Mirabella v. Banco Indus. de la Republica Argentina, 421 N.Y.S.2d 960, 962–63
(Sup. Ct. 1979) (quoting Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
703 (1976)).
141. See, e.g., Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 852
(2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the use of comity to defer enforceability of debt would “violate
United States policy”). International comity is the deference given to foreign government
acts by U.S. courts. Id. at 854. Courts recognize the principle of international comity by
declining to review foreign government acts, “allowing those acts and proceedings to have
extraterritorial effect in the United States.” Id.
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Constitution. 142 Because state law governs contract disputes,143 the
particular law governing a sovereign bond is crucial to the ability of a
creditor to bring a claim against a sovereign debtor. 144 For emerging
market debt, the majority of outstanding bond issuances are governed by
New York law. 145 A study of forty-three emerging market countries
conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that as of
2009, $272 billion spread over 435 issuances fell under New York
jurisdiction. 146
Litigation trends show that default-related lawsuits have been increasing
despite the fact that the overall number of restructurings and defaults by
sovereigns decreased in the same time period. 147 There were 109 sovereign
bond default or loan recovery cases filed against debtor governments in
U.S. or English courts from 1980 to 2010. 148 Recently, successes of
holdout litigation have also provided incentives for holdout creditors to
initiate recovery actions. 149
c. Vulture Funds
A subset of investors that specialize in trading distressed sovereign debt
are called “vulture funds” for what some perceive as their predatory
investing strategies. 150 Vulture funds are institutional investors that
purchase distressed bonds at a fraction of their face value in anticipation of
a restructuring. 151 They purchase sovereign debt on the secondary bond
market when debt is traded at a steep discount due to an impending or

142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . [l]aw impairing the
Obligation of Contracts.”). But see 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012) (U.S. Bankruptcy Code provision
permitting, subject to court approval, special treatment of certain executory contract
obligations in bankruptcy).
143. See, e.g., 82–11 Queens Blvd. Realty, Corp. v. Sunoco, Inc. (R & M), 951 F. Supp.
2d 376, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
144. Das et al., supra note 9, at 41.
145. Id. New York choice-of-law rules are unique in that parties can chose New York
law to govern despite having no minimum contacts that would otherwise avail the parties of
the jurisdiction of New York courts. IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., 982
N.E.2d 609, 611–12 (N.Y. 2012). Parties to a contract are permitted to choose New York
state law to govern “whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a
reasonable relation to this state” so long as the transaction covers at least $250,000. N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 2013). The New York legislature sought to
“encourage the parties of significant commercial, mercantile or financial contracts to choose
New York law” to maintain New York’s status as a commercial and financial center. IRBBrasil Resseguros, 982 N.E.2d at 611–12 (citation omitted).
146. Das et al., supra note 9, at 41–42. This can be contrasted with EU nations, which
were found to issue “more than 80 percent of their public bonds under their own [governing]
laws between 2003 and 2010.” Id.
147. Id. at 51.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 50–51; see also infra Part II.A.
150. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 49.
151. John C. Coffee, Jr. & William A. Klein, Bondholder Coercion: The Problem of
Constrained Choice in Debt Tender Offers and Recapitalizations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207,
1214 (1991).
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actual default. 152 When an exchange offer is then made, vulture funds
exercise their right to hold out and bring suit for breach of contract. 153 The
fund can obtain a judgment and execute it against non-immune sovereign
property under the FSIA 154 or use the threat of judicial enforcement as
leverage to negotiate highly profitable settlement terms. 155
Though problematic, vulture investments may provide benefits to the
restructuring process and the capital markets. 156 First, vulture funds serve
to strengthen creditor protections by invoking the right to hold out and by
serving as a check against opportunistic defaults and overly oppressive
restructuring terms. 157 Second, vulture funds provide liquidity to the
distressed debt market that can encourage active market participation,
benefiting retail investors. 158
Vulture funds are not unique to sovereign bonds. In the corporate bond
context, vulture funds became active about a decade before their investment
strategies expanded into sovereign debt. 159 The key difference is that
domestic corporations can rely on bankruptcy courts to mitigate the
debilitating effects of holdouts on a restructuring. 160
C. The Pari Passu Clause: Inclusion in Sovereign Bonds
and Strategic Use by Holdout Creditors in Restructurings
Pari passu is a Latin phrase that directly translates to “by equal step,” and
means “[p]roportionally; at an equal pace; without preference.” 161 In
sovereign bonds, a pari passu clause, also called an equal treatment
provision, acts as a financing constraint on sovereigns by claiming that the
bond will “rank equally in right of payment with all other external
indebtedness of the sovereign.” 162 In bankruptcy, debtors may have
multiple creditors who hold a variety of debt instruments at different
payment priorities. 163 The pari passu clause restrains a sovereign’s ability
152. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 49–50. Latin American and African
sovereigns have been recurring targets of vulture fund strategies mainly because of the
market availability of their defaulted debt. Id. at 51.
153. See id.
154. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
155. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 49–50.
156. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1047.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Compare Coffee, Jr. & Klein, supra note 151, at 1214 (discussing vulture funds as
“a new player on the financial scene” in the 1991 domestic bondholder context), with Anne
Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director, IMF, International Financial Architecture for
2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov. 26, 2001), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm (raising concern in 2001 about
the “aggressive legal strategy” being used by vulture funds as holdout creditors in sovereign
restructuring).
160. See Coffee, Jr. & Klein, supra note 151, at 1209–10.
161. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1290 (10th ed. 2014).
162. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 25; see also supra notes 29–34 and
accompanying text (discussing external indebtedness).
163. See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt
Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 872–73 (2004).
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to incur debt obligations that could subordinate the right of payment for the
debt instrument containing the clause. 164
As a clause now deemed standard in sovereign bond issuances, pari passu
has a long history of inclusion in sovereign debt instruments. 165 The first
evidence of a pari passu clause in an unsecured sovereign bond appeared in
English bonds in 1902. 166 The clause was increasingly included in
unsecured sovereign bond issuances from 1940 through 2011, becoming
ubiquitous after 2000. 167
Although there are variations in how the clause is drafted, a standard pari
passu clause contains several common characteristics. 168 As a central
concept, the pari passu clause outlines the principle of equal treatment and
defines how that principle is measured. 169 The clause can contain a
mandatory law exception that permits a debtor to enact laws related to its
restructuring that do not legally interfere with the bond obligations.170
Certain jurisdictions also have laws that might alter the operation of the
clause by specifying preference to debt obligations in order of date of issue
or by currency type. 171 To counteract these laws, many clauses hold that
“bonds are pari passu regardless of time of payment or currency of
issue.” 172 Lastly, the language in the clause varies based on the scope of
creditor protection and can be narrowly worded to provide pari passu
protection only to “external indebtedness” or, alternatively, broadly defined
to encompass all unsecured creditors. 173
Despite these variations in the clause, sovereign bonds can be seen as
highly standardized, with contracts “consist[ing] primarily of
boilerplate.” 174 Given the extensive history of sovereign borrowing, certain
terms over time have become standardized boilerplate provisions.175
Boilerplate provisions are believed to have a settled meaning, though the
interpretation still relies on the governing law of the contract. 176
164. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 104, at 990 (describing typical payment hierarchy in
bankruptcy where legally senior and secured creditors have priority against a corporation’s
assets and then unsecured creditors are treated equally among themselves as to remaining
assets or payment).
165. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 109, at 121.
166. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 135.
167. Id. at 121–22 & tbl.3. In a sample of 691 issuances from 2000 to present, 98.7
percent had a pari passu clause. Id.
168. Id. at 63.
169. Id. at 63–66.
170. See id. at 67.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 67–68.
174. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2009). The
term boilerplate has been defined as “[r]eady-made or all-purpose language that will fit in a
variety of documents [or] [f]ixed or standardized contractual language that the proposing
party often views as relatively nonnegotiable.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (10th ed.
2014).
175. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 2–4, 18.
176. See, e.g., GIUDITTA CORDERO-MOSS, BOILERPLATE CLAUSES, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW 353, 370 (2011) (“[T]erms of a contract
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Under New York law, Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. 177 is the controlling case for interpreting boilerplate terms. 178 Under
Sharon Steel, the interpretation of boilerplate bond contract provisions is a
matter of law based on the market understanding. 179 This is because the
need for a consistent and uniform interpretation of boilerplate terms
distinguishes those terms from “contractual provisions which are peculiar to
a particular [bond contract].” 180 The significance is that the actual
contracted-for terms become irrelevant because the intended meaning is
believed to transcend all transactions of the same type. 181
One of the main pushbacks on the boilerplate argument for pari passu
clauses is that the clause did in fact undergo a series of changes in the mid1990s. 182 Whereas the language of the clause was previously identical in
all versions, pari passu clauses today can be grouped into three distinct
categories based on the perceived litigation risk due to the language used in
expressing the principle of equity. 183 Whether or not the pari passu clause
is categorized as boilerplate can therefore be significant in judicial
interpretation, a concept that is explored at greater length in Part II.A.
In addition to the sovereign bond context, equal ranking is also
applicable to domestic bankruptcy proceedings. 184 When a corporate entity
is liquidated, creditors who rank pari passu will receive equal shares of the
proceeds in what is called a pro rata distribution. 185 Despite the prevalence
of equal treatment in domestic bankruptcy, pari passu clauses of the type
found in sovereign bonds rarely appear in domestic credit transactions. 186
This can be attributed to the fact that such equal treatment is implied in the
Bankruptcy Code, and involuntary legal subordination of an existing
creditor is forbidden. 187
are not detached from the governing law: the governing law will influence the interpretation
and application of these terms.”).
177. 691 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1982).
178. See id. 1048–49; William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s
Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823, 863–64 (2004) (explaining the “market
understanding” standard of bond contract interpretation established by Sharon Steel).
179. Sharon Steel, 691 F.2d at 1048.
180. Id.
181. See id.
182. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 121–22 & tbl.122.
183. See id. at 68, 122. For a lengthy discussion of the clause’s litigation risks, see infra
Part II.A.
184. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 25.
185. See id. Pro rata distribution is a payment that is conducted “proportionately;
according to an exact rate, measure, or interest.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1415 (10th ed.
2014). This analogy is imperfect for sovereign debt because a sovereign can never be
liquidated. See Gelpern, supra note 68, at 1116–20.
186. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 873–74.
187. Id. at 873 & nn.6–7; see also supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text (describing
features of sovereign debt distinguishing them from domestic bankruptcy proceedings). In
addition to the prohibition of legal subordination, due to the function of the bankruptcy court
and the ability to force a reorganization plan on unwilling creditors, no situation could arise
where there would be an involuntary subordination in fact and not in law. See supra notes
78–86 and accompanying text. But see 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (2013) (enforcing subordination
agreements).
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A pari passu clause does not become operative until the sovereign lacks
debt sustainability. 188 Additionally, the pari passu clause is mostly relevant
in a world with holdout creditors. That is because if every bondholder
agreed to the terms of the bond exchange, there would be no reason to
inquire into the result on inter-creditor equities. 189 The pari passu clause
governs the relation of inter-creditor rights; however, after debt has been
restructured, the status of unrestructured debt can be comparatively
unclear. 190
In addition to the holdout collection strategies previously mentioned,191
holdout creditors have used the pari passu clause as a legal basis for
claiming contract breach.
Following a bond exchange, a sovereign will begin making interest
payments on the new debt instruments to the bondholders who participated
in the restructuring. 192 Subsequent to the restructuring, the sovereign no
longer makes payments on the defaulted bonds retained by holdouts.193
Holdout creditors then claim that interest payments on the new bonds
violate the pari passu clause, arguing that the original bonds are not being
treated equally to the new bonds. 194 By invoking pari passu in this way,
holdout creditors seek to disrupt payment on the restructured bonds by
stopping interest payments until the equal treatment is restored. 195 In
bringing the claim under pari passu as a breach of contract, holdout
creditors can attempt to receive injunctive relief with specific performance
on the contract as a remedy. 196
This litigation strategy, which was pioneered by vulture fund investors,
tethers the ability of a sovereign to make interest payments on restructured
debt to the payment of obligations owed to holdouts under the original
defaulted bonds. 197 By doing so, the vulture fund can either be paid as a
condition of payment to the exchange bondholders or it can use this
injunctive relief as leverage to extract a profitable settlement. 198 The use of
this strategy has raised questions about the intended meaning of the pari
passu clause and policy considerations relating to the debtor-creditor
balance of power in a restructuring. 199

188. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 874–76 & n.13 (noting that a lender who
remains unpaid when other equally ranking creditors are current on payment would not be
able to invoke pari passu as a legal grounds for relief if the borrower is still solvent).
189. See Yanying Li, Playing Sovereign Debt Creditors’ Orchestra: Inter-Creditor
Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 3 INT’L INSOLVENCY L. REV. 243, 251–53 (2013).
190. See id.
191. See supra Part I.B.3.
192. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 8, at 40.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 55–56.
195. See id.
196. Cohen, supra note 8, at 20.
197. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 55 (noting that “vulture funds invented what
they believed could be a devastating enforcement device”).
198. Id. at 56.
199. These concerns are addressed in Part II.
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II. UNEQUAL TREATMENT FOR THE SAME PROVISION:
PARI PASSU’S DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS, REMEDIES,
AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
This part looks at the judicial interpretations of pari passu, the remedies
that these interpretations require, and the ways that international
organizations and institutions have sought to decrease the potential damage
that pari passu clauses can have on future sovereign debt restructurings.
A. Court Interpretations
This section examines the judicial interpretations of pari passu clauses by
courts in Belgium, the United States, and England, including remedies
contemplated for pari passu breach under each jurisdiction. This analysis
will incorporate the question of whether there is also a standard industry
usage understanding of pari passu, and how a characterization of pari passu
as boilerplate might impact judicial interpretations.
1. Belgium
In 2000, in Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 200 a court
interpreted a sovereign bond’s pari passu clause for the first time. 201 Elliott
sought a ruling from the Belgian Court of Appeals on interpretation of a
pari passu clause under New York law when there was no controlling or
otherwise even persuasive judicial precedent. 202
Prior to bringing the case in Belgium, Elliott had obtained a judgment in
New York against the Republic of Peru following a sovereign bond
default 203 and was awarded over $52 million in addition to an award for
compound interest calculated retroactively on that sum. 204 Although an
amended judgment lifted some of the restrictions on Elliott’s ability to
attach property for the payment of the judgment against co-party Banco de
la Nacion, execution against property for both parties was still “limited to

200. Elliott Assocs., L.P., Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 8th Chamber
Sept. 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.).
201. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 879.
202. Id.
203. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 381 (2d Cir. 1999). The
decision held additional significance in finding that vulture fund investment strategies of
purchasing with the intent to hold out are legally sound. See id. (determining the defense
claiming violation of section 489 of the New York Judiciary Law is unavailable against
creditors where, as with Elliott, the “‘primary goal’ is found to be satisfaction of a valid debt
and its intent is only to sue absent full performance”); see also N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 489
(McKinney 2004). An amendment to N.Y. Judiciary Law section 489 that effectively
eliminated the champerty defense for sovereign debt purchases in excess of $500,000 is said
to be the result of vulture fund lobbying activity that convinced the New York state
legislature to amend the statute. Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 54.
204. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116, 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (awarding Elliott summary judgment against Peru for approximately $52 million plus
interest and an additional approximated $23 million plus interest against Banco de la Nacion,
a Peruvian bank).
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property in the United States” under the FSIA. 205 When the result of the
attachment proceedings left Peru unable to utilize its U.S. payment agent
for payment on its restructured bonds, Peru attempted to redirect its
bondholder interest payments through a clearing system located in Brussels,
Belgium. 206
a. Birth of the Ratable Payment Theory
Ratable payment means a proportionate and ratable distribution,207 also
referred to as a pro rata payment. 208 The argument under the ratable
payment interpretation is that when the bonds were restructured, payment to
the restructured class would violate the pari passu clause because there were
no proportionate payments made simultaneously to the holdout creditors,
therefore violating equal treatment. 209
Elliott used this argument to enforce its New York judgment in
Belgium. 210 In doing so, Elliott tried to intercept a payment that was
scheduled for holders of the external bonds that Peru had issued to
restructured creditors. 211 First, Elliott tracked the payment method to
determine which parties were involved in disbursement of interest funds to
exchange bondholders. 212 Elliott then served notices on all of the parties to
restrain them from making payment to the exchange bondholders. 213
To gain judicial support for the strategy, Elliott filed an ex parte motion
with the Commercial Court in Brussels to enjoin the payment-clearing
agent from processing any of the payments received from Peru to pay the
Brady Bonds. 214 While the Commercial Court denied the motion, Elliott
challenged the denial to the Appeals Court of Brussels, putting forth an
argument based on a violation of the pari passu clause. 215 The challenge
alleged that the “Peruvian Republic attempts to make payments in violation
of a principle of equal treatment (pari passu clause) among foreign

205. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, No. 96 Civ. 7916 (RWS), 2000 WL
1449862, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2000) (finding the “FSIA’s exception to immunity from
attachment—whether for foreign states or their instrumentalities—extends at most to
property located ‘in the United States’” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a), (b))); see also supra
notes 134–38 and accompanying text (discussing the FSIA limitations and property
attachment following judgment).
206. Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253,
257 (2003).
207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1451 (10th ed. 2014).
208. See supra note 185 and accompanying text for a definition of pro rata and discussion
on intercreditor distribution.
209. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 877.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.; see also Elliott Assocs., L.P., Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles,
8th Chamber Sept. 26, 2000, General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.).
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creditors, whereby Elliot Associates is excluded, and tries to use the [agent]
to achieve that objective.” 216
To support the argument that pari passu would be violated if the Brady
Bondholders were paid, Elliott submitted an affidavit from a U.S. law
professor, who opined that “[a] borrower faced with a pari passu provision
must pay all [creditors] on the same basis.”217 The professor believed such
an understanding of pari passu was valid “whether that borrower is an
individual, a company, or a sovereign state.” 218 The affidavit did not cite
any authority in support of these opinions. 219
On September 26, 2000, the Belgian Court granted Elliott’s motion to
block the Brady Bond payment by enjoining the clearing agent and reversed
the lower court decision. 220 The significance of the Belgian Court decision
could not be mistaken; the ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu
clause was born. 221
Shortly after the ruling, Peru settled with Elliott for the full value of
payment sought and avoided putting the Brady Bond payment in
jeopardy. 222 Although Elliott had purchased the bonds for approximately
$11 million on the secondary market, in settlement it received in excess of
$58 million, leading the fund to realize a profit margin of over 500
percent. 223 Though there is speculation as to why Peru did not seek to fight
the injunction or negotiate further with the holdouts, the decision was left
unchallenged. 224
b. The Aftermath of the Belgium Decision
Being the first court opinion to interpret the pari passu clause, the wake
of the decision left many uncertain about the effect the specific ruling
would have on the market. 225 There were reports, statements, and articles
that sought to address the impact of the decision by many who had an
interest in the area of litigation—namely lawyers, academics, investment
banks, and market groups. 226 One academic noted that the ruling “became
the catalyst for some of the most radical and far-reaching proposals for
reform of the international financial system.” 227 The question of what role
vulture funds and holdouts play in sovereign debt restructuring sparked fear
216. Id. (as translated by Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 877).
217. Declaration of Professor Andreas Lowenfeld at 11–12, Elliott Assocs., L.P., General
Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Belg.) (executed Aug. 31, 2000).
218. Id. at 11.
219. See id.; see also Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 878.
220. Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163, at 878–79.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 16.
224. Id. at 15–16 (citing political turmoil as a potential reason for inaction).
225. Id. at 47–49.
226. See id. Years later there has still been discussion about the interpretation’s
consequences. See generally Olivares-Caminal, supra note 8, at 43.
227. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 12. Some of these proposals are addressed in
Part II.B.
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that injunctive remedies might have the potential to unravel sovereign
restructurings and prevent sovereigns from reentering the markets following
future restructurings. 228
One response came from the Belgian government itself. Following the
decision, the Belgian parliament sought to protect clearing systems from
involvement in litigation that could disrupt payment to restructured
bondholders by creating INC Belgian Law 4765 (C-2004/03482) in
November 2004. 229 The law did nothing to alter the interpretation of pari
passu decided by the court, but it limited the enforcement ability of
creditors by removing the type of injunctive relief that had been permitted
in Elliott. 230 Additionally, because Belgium is a civil law country, the pari
passu interpretation in Elliott was not binding on future courts the same
way it would be in a common-law system. 231 In fact, the Court of Appeals
in Brussels had another opportunity to hear a case on pari passu not long
after the first one was decided. In Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC
Investments LLC, the court held in 2004 that payment on restructured bonds
constituted a violation of the pari passu clause for failure to pay holdouts at
a proportionate rate of payment but later reversed its decision on appeal. 232
Prior to LNC Investments, several other litigants had sought relief using
the ratable payment pari passu interpretation applied in Belgium. In
California in 2001, a district court in Red Mountain Finance v. Republic of
Congo 233 decided that the plaintiff was permitted injunctive relief to enjoin
payment of external debt without proportional payment to the holdout.234
Despite the court denying specific performance of the pari passu clause, it
found the same pari passu remedy appropriate to enforce other provisions of
the credit agreement. 235 However, a settlement was reached shortly

228. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 45–48 (discussing the newly perceived litigation
risks and the consensus that Elliott “increased the probability of formal enforcement upon
default”).
229. Loi modifiant les lois du service public fédéral finances [Act Amending Previous
Laws for Federal Public Service Finance] of Nov. 19, 2004, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Dec. 28, 2004, 85,854; see also Olivares-Caminal, supra note
8, at 52.
230. Olivares-Caminal, supra note 8, at 52.
231. Roozbeh B. Baker, Universal Jurisdiction and the Case of Belgium: A Critical
Assessment, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 141, 151 (2009) (“Belgian Courts are strictly
limited to the application of legislation. Court decisions naturally involve interpretation, but
the interpretation is not precedent that is binding on future courts that must consider the
same legislation.”).
232. See Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 56–57; see also [Commercial Court]
Bruxelles, Sept. 11, 2003, General Docket No. 240/RK/03, at 16–17, rev’d, Cours d’Appel
[CA] [Court of Appeal] Bruxelles, 9th Chamber Mar. 19, 2004, General Docket No.
2003/KR/334 (Belg.).
233. Injunction Order, Red Mountain Fin., Inc. v. Democratic Republic of Congo, No.
CV 00-0164 R (BQRx) (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2001), ECF No. 123.
234. Id.; see also Andrea J. Boyack, Sovereign Debt and the Three and a Half Minute
Transaction: What Sticky Boilerplate Reveals About Contract Law and Practice, 35
WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 25 n.127 (2013).
235. Injunction Order, supra note 233; see also OLIVARES-CAMINIAL, supra note 42, at
87.
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thereafter and the decision was repealed. 236 In 2003, a court in England
dismissed an appeal seeking injunctive relief for pari passu breach. 237 A
case alleging breach of pari passu in the New York Court of Appeals from
the same plaintiff, Kensington International, Ltd., was dismissed on forum
non conveniens grounds because the loan and agency agreements being
litigated were governed by English and French law. 238
One of the characterizations of the pari passu clause as a boilerplate
provision suggests that judicial interpretation makes the meaning difficult to
change because subsequent interpretations will be determined as a matter of
law. 239 Additionally, speculation that the Elliott decision would invite
more litigation on the ratable payment interpretation proved accurate. One
might assume that under these circumstances, a legitimate market response
would be to change the language in the pari passu clause to reflect the
“other” widely held interpretation for clarity if it was believed that the
current language was merely faulty boilerplate.240 But, no such alteration
occurred. 241 There have been many factors that could explain the continued
usage of the language without changing it.242 However, those factors
remain mere speculation.
2. New York
One result of the ratable payment interpretation was fear from debtor
nations that the Elliott decision would inhibit their ability to restructure
debt. As a result, in 2003, the Republic of Argentina sought a declaratory
judgment in Macrotecnic International Corp. v. Republic of Argentina 243 to
effectively nullify the precedential value for New York proceedings of the
same type. 244 Although the judge found that at the time there was a

236. See Stipulation and Order, Red Mountain Finance v. Democratic Republic of Congo,
No. 2:00-CV-00164-MLR (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2002), ECF No. 238 (dismissing action with
prejudice and vacating district court orders); see also Cohen, supra note 8, at 16 & n.29
(stating orders subsequently vacated pursuant to settlement agreement).
237. Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. Republic of the Congo, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 709, [2], [16]
(Eng.); see also OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 87–88.
238. See Trial Order at 7–8, Kensington Int’l Ltd. v. BNP Paribas SA, No. 602569/03
(RBL), 2005 WL 5088276 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 11, 2005). Forum non conveniens applies
where the forum is inconvenient because “in the interest of substantial justice” another court
or jurisdiction should hear the action. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 327 (McKinney 2013).
239. See supra notes 174–81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pari passu
clause as boilerplate and the significance for judicial interpretation when boilerplate is
determined for bond contracts.
240. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 30–34.
241. Id. at 51 (alluding to deeply engrained market failures given the fact that in the wake
of Elliott “the pari passu clause was not revised by the simple expedient of inserting
clarifying language that would reduce if not eliminate the litigation risk”).
242. See generally id. at 33–44 (describing theories to explain the “stickiness” of contract
boilerplate).
243. No. 02 Civ. 05932 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. filed July 26, 2002).
244. Motion for Order to Preclude Interference with Payments to Other Creditors,
Macrotecnic Int’l Corp. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 02 Civ. 05932 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
12, 2003), ECF No. 29 (seeking an order to preclude plaintiffs from interfering with
payments to other creditors pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5240).
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nonjusticiable issue as the question of pari passu breach was not yet ripe for
adjudication at that time, the United States submitted a statement of interest
indicating that the Elliott decision in Belgium was “a broad and novel
interpretation of the pari passu clause.” 245 The government stated that the
forced simultaneous ratable payment to all creditors that would prohibit
payment to third-party creditors would simply “undermine th[e] wellunderstood established framework” that the government and international
community had been operating under in sovereign debt restructurings and
would “do damage to settled market expectations.” 246 According to the
standard market understanding, pari passu clauses serve to preserve only the
equal legal ranking of obligations and therefore no violation is found where
in practice some debt is excluded from restructuring. 247 In fact, such
exclusions are historically “common practice” given the realities of
Because under this
sovereign debt restructuring complexities. 248
explanation pari passu does not require actual uniformity of treatment, it is
understood to be interpreted narrowly and not to contemplate ratable
payment in the event of partial restructuring. 249
It is rare that the United States submits a statement of interest amicus
curiae, especially when unsolicited at the district court level.250 This
highlights the significance of the interpretation from a policy standpoint.
The government found that to uphold the Elliott interpretation would not
only adversely affect U.S. interests, but that the judgment mechanism
would not be consistent with the FSIA. 251 The court did not have another
opportunity to test the Elliott interpretation of pari passu until another
vulture fund, NML Capital, a subsidiary to the management affiliate of
Elliott, sought relief in the Southern District of New York.
a. Interpretation of the Pari Passu Provision
In 2001, Argentina experienced the worst economic crisis the country
had ever seen and defaulted on over $95 billion of external debt. 252 The
event was the largest sovereign default in history at the time. Through
exchange offers in 2005 and 2010, Argentina restructured its debt on bonds
that were issued under a 1994 Fiscal Agency Agreement (FAA). 253 Ninetyone percent of bondholders agreed to the exchanges (exchange
245. Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Macrotecnic Int’l Corp., No. 02 Civ.
05932 (TPG), 2004 WL 5475206 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2004), ECF No. 39; see also OLIVARESCAMINAL, supra note 42, at 89–90.
246. Statement of Interest, supra note 245, at 11.
247. Id. at 12–13; see also Blackman & Mukhi, supra note 138, at 55.
248. See Statement of Interest, supra note 245, at 11.
249. Id.
250. Patricia A. Millett, “We’re Your Government and We’re Here to Help”: Obtaining
Amicus Support from the Federal Government in Supreme Court Cases, 10 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 209, 223–24 (2009).
251. See generally Statement of Interest, supra note 245.
252. Mathias Audit, Sovereign Bonds and National Relativism: Can New York Law
Contracts Safely Cross the Atlantic?, 9 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 177, 179 (2014).
253. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2012).
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bondholders). 254 The FAA was issued under New York law, and one of the
holdout creditors, NML Capital, Ltd., sought recovery based on a breach of
the pari passu clause. 255
In 2011, in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Judge Griesa in
the Southern District of New York granted a motion for partial summary
judgment and found that the pari passu clause was breached. 256 While there
was no mention of the term “ratable” in its opinion, the court found that the
clause was violated when Argentina timely paid the exchange bondholders
while “failing to pay the obligations currently due under NML’s Bonds.”257
The pari passu clause in the FAA asserted that the debt obligations would
not only rank pari passu among themselves, but that Argentina’s payment
obligations would “at all times rank at least equally with all its other present
and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness.” 258 The
failure of simultaneous payment was therefore tantamount to lowering the
rank of NML’s bonds by “relegating NML’s bonds to a non-paying
class.” 259 In addition to the finding that payment to exchange bondholders
constituted a de facto rank subordination, the court found that Argentina
had breached the pari passu clause by de jure rank subordination with the
country’s legislative enactment of Laws 26,017 and 26,547. 260 The laws
were passed in conjunction with the exchange offers of 2005 and 2010,
respectively, to entice participation by prohibiting settlement with holdout
creditors who were eligible for participation in the exchange offers.261 In
relevant part, Law 26,547 prohibited “more favorable treatment than what is
offered to those who have not [sought to enforce the original terms of the
bond contract].” 262 The order did not permit injunctive relief for specific
performance on the contract at that time. 263
b. Extending Injunctive Relief to Remedy Breach
Several months later, the court revisited the issue of enforcement and
granted an equitable remedy for the pari passu clause breach, enjoining
Argentina from making payments to the exchange bondholders without

254. Id. The 2005 exchange garnered a 76 percent participation rate. Id. at 252. It
provided FAA bondholders with twenty-five to twenty-nine cents on the dollar for their
exchange bonds. Id. The 2010 exchange offer provided similar terms of restructuring to
FAA bondholders and brought the number of participants up to 91 percent total. Id. at 253.
255. See generally id. at 254–56.
256. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 2011 WL
9522565, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011).
257. Id.
258. Id. at *1 (quoting ¶ 1(c) of the 1994 FAA).
259. Id. at *2.
260. See id.; see also Law No. 26,547, Dec. 10, 2009, [CXVII] B.O. 31,798 (Arg.).
261. See NML Capital, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2. Law 26,547, passed in 2009, suspended
the effects of Law 26,017 for the time period of the 2010 exchange dealings. See id.; see also
Law No. 26,547.
262. NML Capital, 2011 WL 9522565, at *2.
263. Id. at *3.
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simultaneous ratable payments to NML. 264 Like in the Elliott case, 265 the
injunction encompassed the third-party payment clearing agent, and
Argentina was required to notify all such agents of the orders.266
Additionally, the orders prevented Argentina from changing the payment
transfer mechanism to avoid the judgment. 267
This time, instead of settling the dispute, Argentina appealed to the
Second Circuit. 268 Many academics and onlookers thought that the
appellate court would overturn the decision. 269 Instead, on appeal the panel
unanimously affirmed the orders, but it remanded subject to clarification for
how the payment formula was intended to function and the application of
injunctions on third-party intermediaries. 270 Argentina then sought a
rehearing, where the United States again filed a statement of interest amicus
curiae supporting Argentina to reverse what was categorized as an incorrect
interpretation of the pari passu clause. 271 The Second Circuit denied the
rehearing petition. 272
The district court was then tasked with identifying the scope of the
injunctive relief, a juncture that had never been reached in any previous
court proceeding. 273 In the November 2012 amended orders, the court
noted that the exchange bondholders and FAA holdout creditors held debt
instruments that were not of the same amount or of the same nature.274
This is irrelevant for pari passu breach, 275 however, because pari passu
requires only that “obligations under the various debts are complied with to
the same extent, rather than having the obligations on one debt honored and
the obligations on the other debt repudiated, as has occurred in the present
case.” 276
On remand, the district court was specifically tasked with clarifying how
the payment to plaintiffs would operate as well as the function of the

264. Order at 3–4, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012).
These orders were subsequently amended on November 21, 2012. NML Capital, No. 08 Civ.
6978 (TPG), 2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), appeal dismissed, (Sept. 23,
2013), aff’d, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
265. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
266. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *5.
267. Id.
268. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012).
269. See Zamour, supra note 16, at 59–60 (denoting various reactions of shock expressed
in the aftermath of the Second Circuit’s decision).
270. NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 250.
271. Brief for the United States of America As Amicus Curiae Supporting Argentina’s
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012), ECF No. 653 [hereinafter U.S. Amicus
Brief].
272. Order, NML Capital, No. 12-105-cv(L) (2d Cir. Nov. 18, 2013), ECF. No. 1035.
273. See, e.g., supra notes 232–46 and accompanying text (discussing cases that never
fully litigated the pari passu issue to see an injunctive remedy utilized).
274. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *3.
275. Id. (“But it is obvious that a Pari Passu Clause does not require that the debts in
question be in the same amount or of the same nature.”).
276. Id.
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injunctions with respect to third parties, including intermediary banks.277
The district court found that the relief provided under the injunctions would
require Argentina to pay 100 percent of the debt owed to plaintiffs any time
that Argentina seeks to pay 100 percent of what is owed to the exchange
bondholders. 278 This, the court stated, was the “straightforward” meaning
of a “Ratable Payment.” 279 In describing this straightforward meaning, the
district court noted that the Second Circuit’s alternative hypothetical of
ratable payment meaning 280 would be a “radical departure . . . from the Pari
Passu Clause.” 281 No authority was provided to support this assertion.
While the court’s order states that full compliance with the injunctions
would require Argentina to pay the full sum of the $1.33 billion owed to the
plaintiff creditors either concurrently or in advance of payment on the
exchange bonds, 282 Argentina claimed that instead of resulting in
enforcement, the injunctions served to place approximately $24 billion in
restructured debt at risk of default. 283 In deciding that the injunctive
remedy was appropriate, the court noted that while the original default was
due to a legitimate financial crisis, Argentina was capable of making
payments on both the exchange bonds and the holdout claims. 284 There has
been disagreement over the actual ability to pay, and the exact amount
Argentina holds in reserves. 285
Proceedings continued to determine the precise bounds of the injunctive
remedy. The Second Circuit found that in addition to the FAA bonds, the
injunctions span to “other obligations” such as GDP-linked securities in
foreign currency based on the district court’s understanding of the FAA pari
passu clause to rank not only other bonds but all other obligations
277. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 255 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2013), cert. denied sub nom. Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NML
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
278. See NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *3 (finding that a definition of pari passu
meaning “proportionally” was “obviously referring to the use of the same proportion in
paying down two kinds of debts. This is clearly reflected in the Ratable Payment provisions
in the Injunctions, as correctly interpreted. These provisions properly start with the fact that
if 100 [percent] of what is currently due to the exchange bondholders is paid, then 100
[percent] of what is currently due to plaintiffs must also be paid”).
279. Id. The entire opinion and order was written without a single citation to authority or
case that supports this understanding of ratable payment.
280. The Second Circuit hypothesized that ratable payment could also mean that holdout
creditors would need to be paid the same percentage of the total that was being paid to
exchange bondholders. NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 255. This means that if an interest
payment to bondholders constitutes 1 percent of the total amount owed under principal and
interest, then the holdout creditors would need to be paid 1 percent of the total amount owed
to them. Id.
281. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *3.
282. Id.
283. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Republic of Argentina at 26, NML Capital, No.
14-2689-cv(L), 2012 WL 6777133 (2d Cir. Dec. 28, 2012), ECF No. 657.
284. NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895786, at *1.
285. The court has estimated that $40 billion of reserves would be adequate to cover
payment, however, Argentina contends that only $28 billion are currently in reserves. See
Letter from Argentina to Judge Griesa at 2, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG)
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014), ECF No. 708.
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equally. 286 The restructured debt resulting from Argentina’s default was
also issued under several currencies and different governing laws. Due to
the complexities of the restructuring, several clarification motions have
been filed. 287 Many of these proceedings are still ongoing, however, the
court has taken a broad view of the injunctions, generally declining to “start
making important exceptions to the basic ruling and Injunction.” 288
c. U.S. Government Response and Aftermath
Failure to comply with the injunctions has already led Argentina to a
technical default in restructured foreign law bonds. 289 Additionally, the
court orders have produced new claimants seeking “me-too” injunctive
orders for pre- and post-judgment actions. 290 In a letter to the court,
Argentina stated that twenty-five suits had been filed from June through
November of 2014, totaling approximately $1.8 billion in principal and $4.7
billion in judgments. 291 In addition to increasing Argentina-related
litigation, reliance on NML Capital already has been cited as the basis for
other sovereign litigation and enforcement matters regarding the pari passu
clause. 292
Although the United States had filed a statement of interest seeking a
Second Circuit rehearing by claiming that the court had incorrectly decided
the issue, 293 when the rehearing petition was denied and the Supreme Court
declined to hear the issue, the orders were final. 294 Despite the
characterization of the pari passu clause as boilerplate by some scholars
who believe it carries a distinctive standard industry usage that is counter to
the interpretation put forward by U.S. courts, the ratable payment
interpretation remains New York law.
To counteract the rulings, Congress has the ability to enact legislation
much like Belgium did to limit the injunctive remedy. Congress has made
several failed attempts to pass legislation aimed at sovereign restructuring
286. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 241 n.9 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
287. See, e.g., Letter from Euro Bondholders to Judge Griesa at 1 & n.1, NML Capital,
No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014), ECF No. 723 (urging decision on
emergency motion for clarification related to euro-denominated bonds governed by English
law that were the result of the 2005 and 2010 exchange offers); Letter from JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. to Judge Griesa at 1–2, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. July 9,
2014), ECF No. 572 (seeking clarification on treatment of transfers to yen-denominated
bonds governed by Japanese law).
288. See Order at 3, NML Capital, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014),
ECF No. 724 (denying clarification motion for euro bondholders).
289. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
290. Letter from Argentina to Judge Griesa, supra note 285, at 1.
291. Id. at 1 n.1.
292. See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 4, at 192 (mentioning “copycat lawsuit” as
evidence that NML ruling is not unique to Argentina’s specific circumstances). See
generally Exp.-Imp. Bank of the Republic of China v. Grenada, No. 13 Civ. 1450 (HB),
2013 WL 4414875, at *1–4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013).
293. See generally U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 271.
294. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
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both to aid creditors in collecting and to allow sovereign debtors freedom
from vulture fund investors. 295 The inability to gain enough support on
either side of the issue is evidence of the lack of political will to change the
status quo and indicates that legislative enactment is unlikely to be an
effective means of altering the effect of the decisions.296
3. English Bonds and Interpretation
Along with New York law, English law is the other primary choice of
law for governing foreign-issued sovereign bonds. 297 It is therefore
relevant to examine how the pari passu clause is understood there as well as
market reactions to the contract provisions. This section first discusses
several differentiating characteristics between sovereign bonds under
English law and those under New York law. Then, this section discusses a
conflict of law question raised by an ongoing case and some implications of
such a conflict.
In keeping with the public policy reasons for preventing holdout creditors
from souring a debt workout, there have been several mutations to the pari
passu clause governed by English law. Generally, the variations have
adopted language that permits priorities in payment that are required or
permitted under the borrower’s local law. 298 This means that if a
borrower’s local law permits a payment preference to a subset of unsecured
creditors, that payment will not violate the pari passu clause. 299 The pari
passu language that dictates protection of legislatively enacted preference
allowance has been increasingly used in England, and indicates that pari
passu “has become less focused on involuntary subordination over time.”300
Additionally, the long-standing inclusion of CACs in English law sovereign
bonds has meant that holdout creditors traditionally retain less leverage in a
restructuring than do their counterparts where CACs have been less
prevalent. 301
English bonds are also typically structured under a trust indenture, where
a trustee represents the interests of bondholders and can decide whether to
initiate holdout enforcement proceedings on their behalf. 302 As compared
to the New York system of using fiscal agency agreements where the fiscal
agent represents the issuer and therefore lacks any restriction on individual
295. Compare Stop Very Unscrupulous Loan Transfers from Underprivileged Countries
to Rich, Exploitive [VULTURE] Funds Act, H.R. 2932, 111th Cong. § 2(8) (2009), with
Judgment Evading Foreign States Accountability Act of 2010, H.R. 5564, 111th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2009).
296. See John Muse-Fisher, Starving the Vultures: NML Capital v. Republic of
Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of Distressed-Debt Funds, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1671,
1697–99 (2014).
297. OLIVARES-CAMINAL, supra note 42, at 4–5.
298. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 133.
299. See id.
300. Id. at 134.
301. See supra notes 98–103 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of CACs and
their tradition of inclusion in English law–governed bonds).
302. Koch, supra note 34, at 678.
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holdout suits, the English trust structure limits the ability to bring individual
actions. 303 English law limits holdout creditors’ access to litigation over
the bond terms because it prioritizes successful restructuring over providing
remedies to holdout creditors. 304
While England has taken these measures to address concerns in its own
legal system, U.S. court remedies for pari passu breach affect bonds
governed under English law.
When Argentina conducted a bond
restructuring of its 1994 FAA, euro-denominated bonds that were to be
governed under English law were issued pursuant to the indenture that was
the result of the exchange that occurred in 2005. 305 Under the indenture,
Bank of New York Mellon became trustee of the euro-denominated
bonds. 306 As a result of actions brought to enforce the pari passu clause of
the original FAA under New York law, 307 injunctions prevented payment to
any of the bondholders resulting from the exchange of FAA bonds until
Argentina made a ratable payment in principal and interest to the holdout
creditors. 308 This extended to Bank of New York Mellon and sought to
prevent the transfer of funds to the euro bondholders, which would violate
the Bank of New York Mellon’s contractual obligations under English
law. 309
In Knighthead Master Fund LP v. The Bank of New York Mellon, 310 euro
bondholders brought suit in England seeking declaratory judgments to
address obligations under English law in light of these rulings and to
understand whether a foreign court could alter a contract governed under
English law. 311 While the Knighthead case is still ongoing, 312 it raises
important questions on the meaning of the pari passu clause under English
law and on the reach of remedies sought under NML Capital by the U.S.
courts, which in turn raises a major conflict of law issue. 313
303. See id. at 681–85.
304. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 22, at 1324.
305. See Knighthead Master Fund LP v. The Bank of New York Mellon [2014] EWHC
3662 (Ch), [2]–[4] (Eng.); see also Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at 1684 (noting the
“twist” that occurred by having bonds governed by both New York and English law covered
under the same trust indenture).
306. Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶ 5.
307. See supra notes 264–88 and accompanying text.
308. See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG),
2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), aff’d, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014), cert. denied sub nom. Exch. Bondholder Grp. v. NML
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
309. See Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶¶ 18, 20.
310. [2014] EWHC 3662 (Ch), [2]–[4] (Eng.).
311. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
312. The Court permitted a window for holdout creditors from the New York action to
intervene. Id. ¶ 28. NML Capital declined to participate in the action. Letter from NML
Capital to Judge Griesa at 1, No. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2014), ECF No.
725. The euro bondholder matter covers interest payments in the sum of €226 million.
Nishant Kumar, London Court Seeks Argentina Creditors’ Say on Debt Payments, REUTERS
(Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/06/argentina-debt-idUSL4N0SW
70420141106.
313. Compare Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶ 19, with Order at 3, NML Capital, No.
08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2014), ECF No. 724.
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The Knighthead order explicitly notes that the Financial Markets Law
Committee expressed that the pari passu clause would likely be interpreted
differently under English law, and there would be a different remedial
approach under English law. 314 In the New York district court order
preventing the transfer of funds to exchange bondholders, the judge
expressly absolved any bank of liability under the indenture governing the
exchange bonds. 315 The English court stated that while such an order may
allow the bank to avoid liability under U.S. law, it is “hard to see how it can
do so in the eyes of the English Courts, and the bonds in question are
governed by English law.” 316
Before the Knighthead case, there was already discussion of the
differences between contract interpretation according to English law and the
method articulated in NML Capital. Similarly to the way that Sharon Steel
interprets boilerplate bond language as a matter of law, English contract
interpretation follows a market understanding approach so that where
multiple meanings might arise from the bond language, the market
understanding can guide the determination of the parties’ intentions at the
time of contract execution. 317
Pursuant to a review of pari passu clauses by the English Financial
Markets Law Committee, it was determined that the language could give
rise to two alternative interpretations.318 First, pari passu could express
equal legal ranking and was included to prevent sovereigns from legally
subordinating one group of creditors by engaging in preferential legal
treatment to another. 319 Second, pari passu could be a promise to pay all
obligations pro rata when a debtor is unable to pay them all in full. 320 The
committee concluded that under English law the traditionally understood
meaning would be that of ensuring only legally equal ranking and
treatment. 321 The trend in contract interpretation under English law to
value the market understanding of the parties, where such a market
understanding has been widely articulated, suggests that compared to the
New York courts, the English courts would find a disparate interpretation
stemming from the same clause. 322

314. Knighthead, EWHC 3662 (Ch), ¶ 9.
315. Id. ¶¶ 13–14.
316. Id.
317. See Lachlan Burn, Pari Passu Clauses: English Law After NML v. Argentina, 9
CAP. MKTS. L.J. 2, 4 (2014); see also supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text.
318. Burn, supra note 317, at 4.
319. Id. This view is consistent with the standard industry usage argument propounded
by opponents of the NML and Elliott interpretation in the United States. See generally
Buchheit & Pam, supra note 163.
320. Burn, supra note 317, at 4.
321. Id. at 5.
322. See Tolek N. Petch, NML v. Argentina in an English Legal Setting, 9 CAP. MKTS.
L.J. 266, 267–69 (2014); accord Gregory R. Day, Market Failure, Pari Passu, and the Law
and Economics Approach to the Sovereign Debt Crisis, 22 TUL J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 242
n.102 (2014).
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B. Proposed Solutions: Why Deeply Engrained Market Failures
Bar a Simple Problem-Solving Mechanism
In response to the unraveling legal saga and the fear that NML Capital
will encourage increasing vulture fund activity, several proposals have been
put forward to prevent holdout creditors from using the pari passu clause to
disrupt a restructuring. Of particular concern are the economic risks and
consequences of serial defaults and long-term exclusion from the capital
markets. 323 The proposed remedies have come in myriad forms but
generally focus on creating a governing sovereign bankruptcy regime or
implementing a contractual solution.
The modern characteristics of sovereign bond debt and the evolution of
sovereign enforcement jurisprudence have created a complex role for the
pari passu clause. 324 This section looks at alternative proposals for
preventing vulture investors from using pari passu as a way to disrupt
restructurings, discusses the ways in which these solutions reach the heart
of the market failure, and addresses barriers to successful implementation.
1. ICMA Solution
The International Capital Market Association (ICMA) represents more
than 470 investment banks, asset managers, and debt issuers who are
located across fifty-five countries. 325 In August 2014, an ICMA working
group created a standardized pari passu clause that could be placed into
bond documents as a contractual solution to the holdout creditor disruption
of restructurings. 326 The contractual fix is in a proviso to the pari passu
clause that specifically denies any obligation to make ratable payments to
other external indebtedness, particularly excepting any form of conditioning
payment on notes based on payment to other obligations. 327 The purpose of
the particular language chosen was a result of an initiative to “minimi[z]e or
indeed, completely eradicate, the potential for holdout creditors to block or
323. See, e.g., Charlie Devereux & Pablo Rosendo Gonzalez, Argentina Will Repay Paris
Club Debt 13 Years After Default, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 29, 2014),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-29/argentina-agrees-to-repay-9-7-billion-to-parisclub-creditors.html. Argentina’s inability to return to debt sustainability because of trouble
accessing capital markets, high interest rates, currency devaluation (the peso has weakened
by 35 percent since 2002), and massive costs in arbitration and litigation serve as potent
examples of the impact judicial proceedings can have on a sovereign. Id.
324. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 19, at 163 (“[The] sheer number of complicating
factors that distinguish the sovereign debt case study from other areas of transactional
practice suggests caution in offering lessons for the future.”).
325. Membership, ICMA, http://www.icmagroup.org/membership/ (last visited Feb. 23,
2015).
326. Sovereign Debt Information: Standard Pari Passu Provisions for the Terms and
Conditions of Sovereign Notes, ICMA (Aug. 2014), http://www.icmagroup.org/
resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/.
327. Id. (supporting a standard pari passu clause proviso that reads: “provided, however,
that the Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any time
with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no
obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying
sums due on the Notes and vice versa”).
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frustrate a more universal approach to sovereign debt restructuring” in the
wake of NML Capital. 328
2. IMF Solution
Previous attempts by the IMF to establish an overarching bankruptcy
measure called the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) have
been unsuccessful over the last decade.329 Then, in October 2014, the IMF
proposed substantial changes to sovereign bond language. 330 The purpose
of the contractual measure is to dissuade vulture funds from investing in
underperforming debt by reducing their remedies following a default. 331 To
temper the fear that the New York court decisions will exacerbate collective
action problems in future restructurings, the proposed pari passu reform
explicitly excludes the obligation to make ratable payments to holdout
creditors. 332 The proposal advocates for changes consistent with the ICMA
suggested language. 333 The IMF report finds particular need for expedient
implementation of contractual reforms given: (1) the finality of the NML
Capital decision following denial of Supreme Court review, (2) the tension
between the NML Capital interpretation and the alternative, “wellestablished” view of pari passu being solely about pure legal subordination,
and (3) the potential harm pari passu injunctive relief can have as a broadly
applicable remedy and incentive for holdouts. 334 Additionally, the report
touches on the notion that English courts would likely decline to follow the
New York courts’ precedent. 335
3. ICSID Role
The World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), an international arbitration tribunal, established
jurisdiction over a sovereign debt proceeding and the first mass arbitration
(with over 180,000 claimants) when it heard Abaclat v. Argentine Republic

328. ICMA Sovereign Bond Consultation Paper, ICMA, ¶ 4 (Dec. 2013),
http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Maket-Practice/Regulatory-Policy/SovereignDebt-Information/ICMA-Sovereign-Bond-Consultation-Paper-79801-5-863-v1-8161213.pdf.
329. See SCHIER, supra note 35, at 44 (discussing failure of SDRM as a result of “political
resistance in the international community”); see also Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at
1649–51 (detailing failures of the SDRM proposal in the context of international
organizations seeking widespread use of CACs as a “second best” market fix once SDRM
appeared infeasible).
330. See generally IMF, STRENGTHENING THE CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING (Oct. 2014), available
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2014/090214.pdf.
331. Id.
332. See id. at 4, 15.
333. Id. at 14–15.
334. See id. at 7–12. Uncertainty also results from the way courts would apply the course
of conduct analysis—finding pari passu breach only in narrow circumstances that mimic the
actions taken by Argentina or in broader instances. Id. at 11.
335. Id. at 13.
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in 2011. 336 While many touted this accomplishment as the long-awaited
overarching sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, 337 subsequent arbitral
adjudication efforts were plagued by similar problems experienced in the
court system—lack of true sovereign enforcement power and protracted
proceedings. 338 Claims stemming from the Greek debt restructuring are
now before the ICSID, but the effectiveness and feasibility of a successful
resolution will only come to light as the matter progresses. 339
4. Implementation
The Republic of Kazakhstan was the first country to implement
contractual changes to the pari passu clause 340 by fully implementing the
ICMA recommendations to its issuance of $2.5 billion of ten- and thirtyyear bonds that it began marketing in October 2014. 341 The bonds, which
are the first overseas dollar-denominated offering from the country in
fourteen years, could serve as a positive example of the suggested language
reforms. 342 Although this change could signal a new era in bond offerings,
the relative size (compared to Argentina’s $95 billion default) makes
implementation easier than with larger nations.
One barrier to implementation is that each country must adopt reforms
individually. Contract changes only will be influential if the language
becomes incorporated on a large scale in sovereign bonds going forward.
While several countries have already included new language with no
significant price impact, 343 to be effective it would need to be in every
bond. 344 Given one characterization of the pari passu clause as boilerplate,
336. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/AbaclatDecisionon
Jurisdiction.pdf.
337. See Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Note, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Mass
Claims Arbitration before the ICSID, The Abaclat Case, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 505 (2012),
http://www.harvardilj.org/2012/09/sovereign-debt-restructuring-and-mass-claimsarbitration-before-the-icsid-the-abaclat-case/; Jan Asmus Bischoff, The End of Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, TRANSNATIONAL NOTES (Oct. 17, 2011), http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/
transnational/2011/10/the-end-of-sovereign-debt-restructuring/.
338. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Italian Holders of Argentine Sovereign Bonds in
Support of Respondents at 11–12, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., No. 13-990,
2014 WL 1878054 (May 7, 2014) (noting the arbitral award has remained unpaid by
Argentina); Decision, supra note 336, at 7 (noting request for arbitration dated 2006, five
years prior to the decision).
339. See Yanying Li, Policy Implication of PoŠtová Tribunal’s Jurisdiction over
Sovereign Bonds: Bankruptcy Cram-Down and ICSID Arbitration, 23 J. BANKR. L & PRAC.
NL ART. 6 (2014).
340. Kazakhstan is an innovator in the sovereign bond market. In 1997, the developing
nation defied the standard unanimous consent contract by permitting a 75 percent majority of
bondholders to change key financial terms. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 46, at 1628 n.1.
341. See Katia Porzecanski & Lyubov Pronina, Kazakhstan Sells First Overseas Dollar
Bonds in 14 Years, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2014-10-06/kazakhstan-sells-first-overseas-dollar-bonds-in-14-years.html.
342. Id.
343. Mexico, Vietnam, and Kazakhstan have all included new pari passu language in
recent bond offerings. See Hagan, supra note 10.
344. See id.
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and the fact that language was not significantly altered after the Elliott case,
it would seem that other market conditions will be determinative of whether
bond drafting will incorporate the new language. 345 Still, this would not
have any impact on the approximately $900 billion in sovereign bonds that
do not contain the new clauses. 346 Many of these do not mature for another
ten years. 347
III. A CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION TO PARI PASSU
This part explores the insufficiency of proposed solutions, synthesizes
the current state of the law, and advocates for a solution that seeks to limit
vulture fund disruption without leaving traditional creditors unprotected in
the event of an opportunistic default or oppressive restructuring.
Preventing sovereign debtors from fully restructuring and therefore
condemning them to never-ending litigation with holdouts and limited or no
access to capital markets is not a sustainable model. Though there are many
claims that the situation in Argentina was an anomaly, and simply a result
of a “uniquely recalcitrant debtor,” 348 the broad interpretation of the pari
passu clause and the specific wording in the orders suggest that NML
Capital’s precedential value will extend well beyond the specific
circumstances of the case. Such precedent will certainly be difficult to
distinguish in future cases where bonds governed by New York law contain
similar pari passu clauses. Given the trends in sovereign default it is not
likely that Argentina will be the last nation to face this issue. 349 On the
other hand, because of the high prevalence of sovereign defaults there is a
need for some sort of deterrence mechanism that emphasizes the severity of
a default and serves as a deterrent to overborrowing by promoting fiscal
responsibility and creditor protection from coercive restructuring terms.
A. Why Proposed Solutions Are Insufficient
When looking at the proposals discussed in Part II.B, two vulnerabilities
are apparent. First, there is no incentive for uniform implementation.
There are many reasons why a sovereign might be reluctant to alter standard
contract terms, even faulty ones. 350 Given transaction costs associated with
such changes, a sovereign that is 100 percent certain that it will be able to
fully pay its creditors would not need to prioritize altering bond language.
Therefore, those sovereigns that are first to make the changes could signal
debt obligation insecurity that might result in increased lending costs. As a
check against sovereign debtors, however, such a result might bring
positive changes to sovereign borrowing habits by preventing
345. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.
348. NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 247 (2d Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014).
349. See supra notes 57–67 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of language
change following the Elliott decision).
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overborrowing if cost of funds increase. 351 In aggregate, there would need
to be an overall umbrella organization or incentive system to compel
sovereigns to make the contract changes.
Otherwise, selective
implementation might not only create the aforementioned price volatility,
but it would be ineffective in eliminating the problem of holdout litigation
stemming from pari passu injunctive relief unless a critical mass of
committed sovereigns was established. As seen with the SDRM and ICSID
frameworks, overarching regimes have either been unable to come to
fruition or have not proved to be an adequate alternative to the status
quo. 352 Even a smaller-scale collective created solely to incentivize
widespread contract language implementation likely would present some of
the same difficulties.
Another lingering problem beyond the issue of actual implementation
and market response is the question of how to handle bonds that have been
issued under the old language, and therefore are subject to existing law on
pari passu interpretation. Solving problems for future restructurings is
certainly a step in the right direction, but it leaves billions of dollars of debt
subject to the same conflicting legal problems that were discussed in Parts I
and II of this Note. Any sort of overarching solution that would solve the
pari passu problem altogether would therefore require a two-pronged
remedy aimed both at future bond offerings and at those currently in
existence that are vulnerable to the holdout creditor problem.
B. The Law As It Stands
The New York interpretation of the pari passu clause as a ratable
payment provision is the current law. 353 The Second Circuit affirmed
injunctive relief, and the Supreme Court has denied a petition to review the
decision. 354 As the law currently stands, the ratable payment interpretation
invites a remedy for injunctive relief to use third-party intermediary banks
to prevent payments to a restructured class until the holdout creditors are
paid. 355 The only way that judicial interpretation might change is if another
action is brought before the court that has different pari passu language.356
Given the broad scope of the ratable payment interpretation and the broad
injunctive remedy provided, this does not seem likely. 357 Congress also has
the ability to limit injunctive relief in enforcement, however that seems
unlikely as well due to polarized political views on the balance of
incentives to ensure sovereign debt sustainability while maintaining
bondholder remedies to enforce payment. 358

351. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 70, 329, 347–50 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 256–91 and accompanying text. The interpretation would not,
however, be binding on outside circuit courts or on New York state courts.
354. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
355. See supra Part II.A.2.
356. See supra notes 16–17, 334 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 252–89, 292 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 293–96 and accompanying text.
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The Knighthead determination 359 will be important. If the English court
rules that Bank of New York Mellon is not exempt from liability to service
payment to euro bondholders, and therefore must perform under the
exchange bond contract, it would create a body of law that runs counter to
the ratable payment interpretation. It would incentivize a country that seeks
to restructure debt governed by New York law to restructure under English
law in euro-denominated bonds so that it is beyond the pari passu
interpretation subject to enforcement by New York courts. 360
It cannot be the case that by restructuring bonds partially in foreign
currency and governed by foreign law that those exchange bondholders get
paid in full while the holders of U.S. law bonds denominated in dollars are
held up until holdouts get paid. Such a practical application of the law
would necessarily lead to a certain breach of any understood meaning of
pari passu because it would create completely arbitrary unequal treatment of
creditors who are in fact part of the same restructured class.
C. Limiting Vultures Without Disrupting Holdout Balance
A proper solution to the holdout creditor disruption of sovereign bond
restructurings needs to strike a balance between limiting vulture fund
investing strategies while also creating an internal control for concerns of
fairness and safeguarding creditor rights, particularly in the event of an
opportunistic default.
1. Infeasibility of a Sovereign Bankruptcy Structure
Creating a bankruptcy regime to govern the distribution of payments in a
sovereign default would solve the problem of pari passu. Having one
centralized framework to work out all creditor issues and thereafter allow
the sovereign debtor to be free of restructuring disruption would create the
ideal scenario for a sovereign to gain a fresh start. This approach, however,
would not be feasible because of a number of practical concerns. First, a
successful sovereign bankruptcy structure would require the participation of
all nations. 361 Second, it would require enforcement capabilities, without
which compliance with payment determinations would be voluntary and
therefore essentially useless. 362
Much like in the U.S. bankruptcy system, the bankruptcy court would
need to hold exclusive jurisdiction on such matters and also the ability to
enforce any money judgments or awards. Given the fact that sovereignty is
highly valued under principles of foreign sovereign immunity and comity, it
359. See supra notes 311–16 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 311–22 and accompanying text (describing the potential conflict-oflaw issue in addition to analysis of how pari passu would be interpreted under English law).
361. See KRUEGER, supra note 73, at 33–34 (discussing the importance of uniformity and
an exclusive jurisdiction for a single international judicial entity to avoid fragmented dispute
resolution).
362. See supra notes 99–128 (explaining many ways that creditors can take advantage of
the voluntary bond exchange process); supra note 338 (illustrating, in the ICSID case, how a
sovereign debtor can take advantage of essentially voluntary compliance).
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would be impossible to have a successful regime without each nation
waiving some large degree of sovereignty. Many nations would likely be
reluctant to do so, and in the event of an unfavorable ruling, would likely
have difficulty with compliance measures. Such avoidance of unfavorable
rulings already has been seen in the ICSID issues with Argentina.363
Additionally, the IMF’s SDRM proposal never was able to get off the
ground. 364 The failure of that attempt was not for a lack of political
visibility or effort on the part of the IMF. 365 Despite much public visibility
of the issues and many attempts to create an overarching framework, none
has been successfully implemented to date. 366 Scholars have written on
ways to alter a bankruptcy framework to address discrete barriers, yet there
has been no significant headway. 367 This seems to suggest that at least as
to how the market is currently situated, a bankruptcy regime therefore
would not be the most efficient or expedient measure to create a resolution
on the pari passu issue.
2. Contractual Solution
Given the difficulties in creating an overarching sovereign bankruptcy
regime, a contractual solution to the problem likely would be the most
pragmatic solution to prevent pari passu interference going forward. It
would allow the language to be tailored to the purpose of preventing vulture
fund holdout creditors from interfering with payment on exchange bonds
but without removing creditor rights that are otherwise essential for a
functioning market. While the contractual solutions proposed in Part II.B
address some of these concerns, there are two reasons why they are
incomplete solutions.
First, the proposed contractual language creates an imbalance of creditor
rights by stripping holdouts of their right to hold out and litigate for the full
value of the claims under pari passu. 368 Although provisions to that effect
have been successfully included in several sovereign bond offerings without
significant price variation, the widespread inclusion of such terms runs the
risk of preventing creditor quid pro quo that could negatively impact their
ability to bargain during a restructuring. 369 Second, it does nothing to
address the nearly $900 billion in outstanding bonds that do not include a
newly crafted pari passu clause. Even bonds that contain CACs are at
increased risk of pari passu litigation because vulture funds can purchase a
363. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
365. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text; see also supra note 329 and
accompanying text.
368. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (including language that “the Issuer shall
have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) . . . to any such other external
indebtedness”).
369. See supra notes 75–87 and accompanying text (comparing balance of power
between creditors and debtors in a domestic bankruptcy context to the leverage each brings
to the table in a voluntary restructuring).
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large enough share to block a majority or create additional reasons for other
creditors to hold out in a restructuring. 370 This Note argues that a
contractual solution “plus” is the best workaround to fixing the uncertainty
of the pari passu clause. Such a contractual solution “plus” includes a
contractual solution in conjunction with a remedy for outstanding bonds.
a. Ninety-Day Presumption Proviso
Given the fact that the vulture fund investment strategy is to purchase
large quantities of defaulted or near-defaulted bonds on the secondary
market and then hold out in a restructuring, a proviso to the pari passu
clause should be included to limit equal treatment for those activities. The
aftermath of the vulture fund victories in Elliott and NML Capital evoke a
sense of unfairness at the idea that such investors can purchase large
quantities of sovereign bonds at a deep discount and then halt payment on
the restructured bonds when a majority of creditors accepted the reduced
terms. Based on the language of the pari passu clause and the use of pro
rata distribution in domestic bankruptcy, 371 if the clause is to have a
meaning, it must mean that all bonds from the same issuance should be
treated equally to protect creditors (though the metric to determine equality
still remains a murky subject area). The ratable payment interpretation,
however, clearly holds value as an enforcement tool for creditors and
should not be so quickly stripped from a creditor’s protective leverage in a
restructuring.
In order to limit pari passu injunctive relief for vulture funds only, a
contractual proviso should be aimed at what differentiates them from other
investors—the timing of bond purchase coupled with the intention to hold
out. A proper contractual proviso would state that the bonds rank pari
passu among themselves and other current and future external indebtedness
provided that the bonds were purchased on or before ninety days prior to
the announcement of default or restructuring. The concept of a ninety-day
period is borrowed from section 547 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code that deals
with avoidance of intercreditor preferences that disadvantage unsecured
creditors. 372 While the analogy to section 547 is imperfect because
voidable preferences are concerned with transfer of the debtor’s property
whereas in the sovereign debt context the issue is with purchases made by a
creditor, the policy considerations for protection of the general body of
370. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1093–95 (finding disadvantages of CACs
include limitation to restructure bonds beyond a particular bond issue and the inability to
“eliminate the strategic use of litigation”); see also Koch, supra note 34, at 684 (finding the
ratable payment interpretation of pari passu has “potential to effectively unhinge CACs”).
371. See supra notes 185–90 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing relevance of a ninety-day
period in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as a presumption that the debtor is insolvent during that
period, and to avoid preferential transfer of assets to creditors during that period that would
give them a priority over other unsecured creditors). There are benefits and costs to having a
bright line rule. Although such a rule produces a consistent and predictable standard, it
could be subject to manipulation in this context particularly because sovereign entry into
restructuring is characteristically much different from corporate bankruptcy.
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unsecured creditors remain the same. Like a preference, a sovereign bond
sale made during a time when the sovereign is in financial distress to a
vulture investor that is certain to hold out and seek injunctive relief
constitutes an event that makes creditors overall worse off.
The ninety-day period would act to decrease the incentive of vulture
funds to invest, but permit smaller retail investors to hold out and seek the
full value of their claims in an unfair or highly coercive restructuring.
Additionally, providing such a ninety-day period would create an incentive
for sovereign debtors to address unsustainable debt burdens before the
sovereign becomes entangled in a crisis. Such incentives for preemptive
restructuring would address concerns that sovereigns tend to postpone an
announcement of default, causing the sovereign to restructure too late.373
By engaging in an earlier restructuring, sovereigns can avoid substantial
value loss and increase the chances of a successful restructuring. 374
While suspending a pari passu remedy for vulture funds might otherwise
have adverse effects on the liquidity flows to the secondary bond market,375
the ability to seek a judgment for contract breach and execute a subsequent
order of attachment would not be impaired. 376 There also would be no
limitation on purchasers of the distressed sovereign debt seeking to
participate in a restructuring. Additionally, because such a proviso would
reduce the risk of vulture fund holdouts while still retaining a check on
opportunistic default for traditional creditors, the inclusion of such a clause
should not result in a decrease in market value and could in fact increase the
value of the debt. 377 In contrast to the issue of implementation with
existing proposed contractual solutions, 378 the proviso would create market
incentives for inclusion and would have fewer barriers to widespread use.
b. The Outstanding Bond Issue: The “Plus” Factor
In addressing the billions of dollars in outstanding foreign law–governed
bonds, the remedy should either come from legislative enactment or from
sovereign debt restructuring strategy.
i. Legislative Limitations Unlikely
On the one hand, Congress has competing interests in ensuring that there
is adequate pushback on opportunistic default and less pressure for

373. COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 2,
11–12 (2013), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/
10/sovereign%20bankruptcy/ciepr_2013_revisitingsovereignbankruptcyreport.pdf.
374. Id.
375. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
377. Cf. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 18, at 1093–94 (concluding that a contractual
approach which both solves the collective action problems and reduces the risk of holdouts
should raise the value of the debt so long as the solution is not expected to “increase the
likelihood of opportunistic defaults”).
378. See supra notes 368–70 and accompanying text.
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bondholders to take a large haircut. 379 On the other hand, there is an
interest in permitting countries to begin anew after restructuring and not be
dragged through years of debilitating litigation that strains the economy and
prevents return to capital markets. 380
The political will is not likely to emerge in the near future to put forth
federal legislation like the Belgian law preventing injunctive relief.381
Another way that Congress could act to disincentivize vulture fund
investing could be to pass legislation stating that, in the event of sovereign
default or restructuring, pro rata payment would be limited to the actual
payment price on the bond and not the full face value. 382 The result of such
action, while likely being successful to deter vulture fund investing, would
also chill the secondary market and would therefore be overbroad.
The New York state legislature also has the ability to alter the bounds of
equitable relief permitted by the courts. As the cause of action originates
under New York law, it might even seem most appropriate for any
legislative solution to originate at the state level.383 Previous successful
lobbying attempts by vulture funds, however, indicate that any statutory
solution limiting holdout remedies is not likely to come to fruition. 384
ii. Creative Interpretation: Purposeful Avoidance
One unfortunate reality is that the best option for sovereign debtors to
avoid conflict with pari passu interpretation for outstanding bonds is to
purposely avoid New York jurisdiction in the event of a restructuring. The
Knighthead case is still ongoing, though it appears that the English courts
will interpret pari passu not as a ratable payment understanding but rather a
pure legal subordination interpretation, informed by the “traditional” market
understanding of pari passu’s functionality. 385 What that means is that if
any of the bonds currently governed under New York law become
unsustainable debt, the sovereign should restructure all of its debt under
foreign law and in foreign currency, likely under English law. Because the
clearing agents and disbursement mechanisms also would be under foreign
law, the court in New York would lack the remedy of injunctive relief
because the third-party intermediary would be beyond the reach of the
court’s jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
This Note explores the sovereign bond market, the restructuring process,
and the role of the pari passu clause. It discusses various interpretations of
379. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 294–95 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 294–95; see also supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.
382. Compare supra notes 151–55 and accompanying text (discussing vulture fund
purchases of bonds at a reduction of face value), with supra notes 66–67, 112–17 and
accompanying text (discussing face value reduction generally in the context of an exchange).
383. See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 205.
385. See supra notes 314–22 and accompanying text.
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the pari passu clause in sovereign bonds, remedies that are associated with
those understandings, and the legal issues which are presented in the
restructuring context. This Note examines several proposals for reducing
restructuring disruption by holdout creditors. These have not adequately
addressed the problem of the outstanding bonds or the protection of nonvulture creditors’ rights. The primary proposal put forth by this Note—a
contractual provision that would limit pari passu injunctive relief for bonds
purchased within the ninety days before a default or restructuring
announcement and also incentivize sovereign borrowers to initiate
restructuring negotiations sooner—serves the interests of both debtors and
creditors. Additionally, assuming Congress will not act to limit the scope
of the current judicial interpretation of the pari passu clause, the best
strategy for outstanding bonds is to restructure the interpretation of pari
passu under another jurisdiction’s law (whether English or otherwise) so
that it will not risk blocking payment to exchange bondholders.

